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COMMERCIAL TRADEMARK PARODY,
THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT,
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
One morning the CEO of Anheuser-Busch flips through his morning paper
and sees a full page print advertisement.' Three frogs, clearly resembling the
ones trademarked and used in Budweiser advertisements, are in a room littered
with cans of "Sudmeister" beer that bear striking similarity to Budweiser cans
and resemble Budweiser's trademarked symbols. One frog is sprawled on the
floor, rubbing a webbed foot against his tympanic membrane and grimacing in
agony. Another frog's eyes are red and bulging ridiculously. A third is
doubled over in the corner of the room projectile vomiting. On the other side
of the room are three other frogs. These frogs look cheery and have broad
smiles. Each is holding a bottle of "Hangunder"2 pain reliever. In cartoon
bubbles over their heads are words attributed to the frogs. "Hang," croaks one.
"Und," croaks the second. "Er," croaks the third.3 Across the bottom of the
advertisement in plain black print reads: "Why let last night hangover when you
can Hangunder?"
Anheuser-Busch, the well-known brewer, might understandably be offended
at Hangunder's parody of their trademarked symbols to sell a hangover relief.'
While the advertisement does not directly disparage its product, the
advertisement does imply that Budweiser causes hangovers and is less
pleasurable than Budweiser advertisements would lead one to believe.
Additionally, this advertisement represents another commercial entity's effort to
1. Anheuser-Busch is the producer of Budweiser beer. This hypothetical scenario is purely a
fictitious creation of the author to illustrate legal principles. As such, no actual persons living or
dead are intended to be portrayed in the hypothetical, the purpose of which is to explore issues of
trademark dilution in a commercial trademark parody. For reasons illustrated later, this parody is
somewhat repulsive. The author apologizes for any offense to the reader's sensibilities.
2. For purposes of this hypothetical, Hangunder is the name of a new, effective, and high
quality pain reliever. This hangover relief medicine is marketed nationwide in major drugstores,
and the advertisement was printed in numerous national newspapers daily for a period of one week
and is slated for continued use.
3. One of the popular Budweiser campaigns of the 1990's involved advertisements featuring
three frog characters in various humorous situations with Budweiser beer. In the advertisements,
the three frogs croaked "Bud," "weis," and "er" to form the name of the beer.
4. A parody is "a literary or musical work in which the style of an author or work is closely
imitated for comic effect or in ridicule." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 857
(1983). A parodist is "a writer of parodies." Id. at 857.
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promote sales of its own product.' Hangunder believes it has a right, in its own
advertisement, to use Budweiser beer and frog trademarks to poke fun at
Budweiser's marketing; however, Anheuser-Busch believes that the parody
compromises its Budweiser beer and frog trademarks.6
This situation is not altogether unique. Many cases involving the parodic
uses of trademarks litter the federal reporters.7 Most of these cases involve the
use of another's trademark as part of an expressive noncommercial' parody.9
However, the Hangunder hypothetical highlights a use of another's trademark
in a commercial message, yet still containing an expressive element society
should protect. l
5. Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (characterizing commercial
speech as that which proposes a transaction).
6. Throughout this note, a "parody" of another's trademark will often be referred to as a "use"
of the trademark which is the "target" of the parody.
7. See Jordache Enters., Inc., v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987) (involving
the imitation designer jeans for large women and thus played off of "Jordache" name with
"Lardashe"); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1 st Cir. 1987) (involving fake
sex toy catalog modeled after L.L. Bean fashion catalog); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836
F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987) (involving t-shirts and accompanying products marketed with alteration of
Mutual of Omaha Indian head trademark to comment on nuclear waste); Dr. Seuss Enters. v.
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (involving humorous account of
O.J. Simpson double murder trial in the style of trademarked children's books); Eveready Battery
Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. I11. 1991) (involving actor Leslie Nielsen in beer
ads dressed as Eveready's trademark bunny character); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 215
U.S.P.Q. 124 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (portraying Pillsbury "Poppin' Fresh" trademark in sexual acts);
Reddy Communications, Inc. v. Environmental Action Found., 477 F. Supp. 936 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(depicting the trademark mascot of a public utility as expressing derision toward paying customers
of the utility); General Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1036 (D. Mass. 1979) (altering
trademark to "Genital Electric"); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (altering trademark slogan of Coca-Cola to read "Enjoy Cocaine").
8. A noncommercial parody is one that is not being used to sell a product or propose a fiscal
transaction. See infra notes 152-209, 423 and accompanying text.
9. "Parody appropriates commonly known elements of a prior work to make humorous or
critical comment on that same work, whereas satire [appropriates] commonly known elements of a
prior work to make humorous or critical comment on another subject." Dr. Seuss Enters., 924 F.
Supp. at 1567 n.6 (referring to Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994)).
This is relevant to the analysis of a First Amendment defense, chiefly in determining a fair use
within copyright. The differences in terminology between "parody" and "satire" have been treated
as semantic by the courts thus far. For trademark cases involving satire see, e.g., Mutual of Omaha
Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987) (using the Mutual of Omaha trademark to comment
on the dangers of the nuclear age). For a case involving a parody, see, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc.
v. Balducci Pubs., 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994) (involving advertisement parody equating plaintiffs
beer with oil to comment on the beer and to comment on environmental concerns).
10. The more expressive speech is, the more protection it is granted under the First
Amendment. To the extent that the advertisement, as commercial speech, expresses more than a
proposal of a commercial transaction, it is protected. See infra notes 211-58 and accompanying text.
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Before the Federal Trademark Dilution Act" (FTDA) was added in 1996,
federal trademark law under the Lanham Act 2 gave relief to owners of
registered trademarks only when another party's use of the registered trademarks
constituted infringement or unfair competition. 3 These established federal
trademark infringement and unfair competition statutes required that a
defendant's use of another's trademark create a likelihood that the consuming
public will be confused as to the source of a good. 14
Often, parodic uses of trademarks elude both infringement and unfair
competition causes of action. 5 This is because trademark owners who sue
parodists for using their trademarks to express the parodist's ideas encounter one
general problem: parodies often do not create a likelihood of confusion. 6
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. 1 1996).
12. The Lanham Act is the source of federal trademark protection. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127
(1994 & Supp. 1 1996).
13. This Act is known as the Trademark Act of 1946 or, more commonly, as the Lanham Act.
Infringement and unfair competition are actions against another's use of the owner's trademark that
would likely confuse consumers as to the source of goods to which the junior use is applied. For
a more detailed discussion of infringement and unfair competition, see infra notes 56-78.
14. The statute reads:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising
of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages,
wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive.
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994).
To establish trademark infringement, two requirements must be met: (1) the plaintiff must
own a protectible trademark, and (2) the defendant's use must create a likelihood of consumer
confusion. Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc.. 826 F.2d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 1987).
Likelihood of confusion measures the degree to which a purchaser is likely to be confused as to the
source of the good with which the trademark is being associated. See infra notes 263-319 and
accompanying text. Likelihood of confusion is a condition for liability. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994)
(the Lanham Act's infringement statute requiring a showing of a likelihood of confusion); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a) (1994) (the Lanham Act's unfair competition statute requiring a showing of a likelihood
of confusion). Furthermore, prior to 1996, the Lanham Act did not have an antidilution statute.
15. This advertisement would not be likely to confuse as found upon a weighing of the Polaroid
factors of likelihood of confusion. For an analysis of the likelihood of confusion of the Hangunder
advertisement, see infra section III.A.
16. The nature of a trademark parody often prevents it from infringing the senior trademark.
See, e.g., Cliff's Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g. Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir.
1989) (enjoining "Spy Notes" study guide parody of Cliff's Notes study guide trademarks
overturned); Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., No. 95-Civ.-5473, 1995 WL 567369
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Thus, trademark owners had little relief against parodies under federal
trademark law prior to 1996.1
7
That is not to say that parodists have been totally free from liability. Many
states have had their own trademark protection systems. Starting with
Massachusetts in 1947, many states added antidilution"8 statutes to protect the
commercial value of trademarks without requiring the owner to show a
likelihood of confusion. 9 These statutes have allowed relief against those uses
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1995) (holding that Spa'am muppet character did not infringe Spam trademark
for lunch meat); Black Dog Tavern Co., Inc. v. Hall, 823 F. Supp. 48 (D. Mass. 1993) (holding
that t-shirts with "Black Hog" and "Dead Dog" parodies did not infringe plaintiffs "Black Dog"
trademark); Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. I11. 1991) (holding
that actor Leslie Nielsen in pink bunny suit with drum did not infringe Eveready rabbit trademark);
American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Lab. Corp., No. 87-Civ.-8840, 1989 WL 39679
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1989) (holding that "condom card" did not infringe American Express credit
card trademarks); Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48 (D.N.M. 1985) (holding
that "Lardashe" jeans and pig embroidery on pocket did not infringe Jordache jeans trademark and
trademark pocket embroidery); Tetley, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 785
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that bubble gum cards for Petley flea bags did not infringe Tetley tea bags
trademark); Pillsbury v. Milky Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (holding that
depiction of Pillsbury trademark characters in sexual acts did not infringe the trademark in the
characters). But see Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Cal.
1996) (holding that book about O.J. Simpson trials done in style of Dr. Seuss book infringed Dr.
Seuss trademarks); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Pubs., 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding
that fake advertisement for Michelob only infringed Michelob trademarks); Hard Rock Cafe
Licensing Corp. v. Pacific Graphics, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (holding that
Hard Rain cafe t-shirts infringed Hard Rock cafe trademark); Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing
Co., Inc., 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that Joe Piscopo depiction of obese rapper
infringed trademark in Fat Boys rap group); Wendy's Int'l, Inc. v. Big Bite, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 816
(S.D. Ohio 1983) (holding that depiction of red haired girl in pig tails eating hamburger and
declaring "Ain't no reason to go any place but Big Bite" infringed Little Wendy and "ain't no reason
to go anywhere else" trademark); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding that poster altering "Enjoy Coca-Cola" trademark to read "Enjoy
Cocaine" infringed the trademark).
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. 1 1996). Prior to the passing of the FTDA, the
Lanham Act provided for damages or injunctions where the defendant's use of a registered
trademark was likely to cause confusion. Id. § 1114. A cause of action also existed where a
trademark incorporated a false word, term, name, symbol, or device as a false designation of origin.
Id. § 1125(a). See infra notes 56-78 and accompanying text.
18. For purposes of this note, I will refer to laws providing a cause of action against dilution
as antidilution laws.
19. Antidilution statutes are aimed at protecting trademarks from a gradual whittling away (or
dilution) of their value by the actions of others, but do not require a showing that the action of the
other is likely to confuse the purchasing public. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 25 cmt.b (1995). "These antidilution statutes protect the commercial value or 'selling power' of
a [trade]mark by prohibiting uses that dilute the distinctiveness of the [trade]mark or tarnish the
associations evoked by the [trade]mark." Id. § 25 cmt.a.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-113 (Michie 1996); CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1987 & Supp. 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-11 i(c)
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 3 [1998], Art. 5
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of another's trademark that might dilute a trademark's valuable distinctiveness
or tarnish the reputation associated with the trademark.20 A trademark owner
might use such an antidilution action to enjoin a use of her trademark, such as
a parody, without having to establish a likelihood of confusion. Since January
16, 1996,2" when the FTDA was enacted, the Lanham Act has contained an
antidilution cause of action.2 This statute substantially mirrors numerous state
antidilution statutes.23 In effect, the FTDA provides for uniform nationwide
(West 1987 & Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151
(West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 48-513 (Supp. 1997); 765 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 1036/65 (Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 548.113 (West Supp. 1996); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 51:223.1 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 1980); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. IIOB, § 12 (West 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.165 (West 1995); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 417.061(1) (West 1990 & Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-334 (1995);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-122 (1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-A:12 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 57-38-15 (Michie 1995); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 360-1 (McKinney 1996); OR. REV. STAT. §
647.107 (1988); 54 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1124 (West 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS §6-2-12 (1992);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-512 (1995); TEx. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (West Supp.
1997); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.77.160 (Supp. 1997).
While the use of the words "mark" and "trademark" may seem a bit confusing, both are
necessary for a meaningful discussion of trademarks. A mark refers to a symbol used in trade to
identify a good that is not necessarily registered as a trademark with the Patent and Trademark
Office. See infra note 24. For an example of an author using these words almost interchangeably,
see DONALD A. GREGORY ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 82 (1994).
20. A parody constitutes a use in that a substantial part of the subject trademark is manifest in
the parody. Dilution is defined by two distinct branches: (1) diminution of distinctiveness, wherein
the use makes the subject trademark less capable of identifying the source of goods, and (2)
tarnishment, which lowers the positive association value of the trademark by implied harm to
reputation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 (1995). See infra notes 79-
151 and accompanying text.
21. "Mhe amendments [to section 1125] made by this Act shall take effect on the date of the
enactment of this Act [Jan. 16, 1996]." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. 1 1995).
22. Id. This provision states:
(c)(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled. .. to an injunction against another
person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after
the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark,
and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection.
Id. § 1125(c)(1).
23. Compare
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and
upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against another person's
commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark
has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to
obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection.
Id. § 1125 (c)(1) (Supp. 1 1995), with
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a
mark registered under this chapter, or a mark valid at common law, or a trade name
valid at common law, shall be a ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence
of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods
or services.
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antidilution protection for trademarks, without requiring a likelihood of
confusion. 4
Although the American public has an interest in protecting trademarks since
it increasingly relies on trademarks, the public also has an interest in the free
expression of ideas through parodies of trademarks.' Only recently has the
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996), and
Every person . . . using a trademark . . . may proceed by action . . . to enjoin
subsequent use by another of the same or any similar trademark ... if there exists a
likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of the
trademark . . . notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or of
confusion as to the source of goods or services, except that this Code section shall not
deprive any party of any vested lawful rights acquired prior to March 4, 1955.
GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451(b) (1994), and
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a
mark or trade name shall be a ground for injunctive relief in cases of infringement of
a mark registered or not registered or in cases of unfair competition, notwithstanding
the absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the
source of goods or services.
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 360-1 (McKinney 1996), and
One may be subject to liability under the law of trademarks for the use of a designation
that resembles the trademark, trade name, collective mark, or certification mark of
another without proof of a likelihood of confusion only under an applicable antidilution
statute. An actor is subject to liability under an antidilution statute if the actor uses such
a designation in a manner that is likely to associate the other's mark with the goods,
services, or business of the actor and:
(a) . . . the association of the mark . . . is likely to cause a reduction in that
distinctiveness; or
(b) . . . tarnish the images associated with the other's mark.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25(1) (1995).
24. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3-4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030-31.
The Act provides for protection of "famous marks" including registered marks and others that may
not be registered but meet the statutory requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. 11995). The
scope of such protection is nationwide. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d
358, 362 (2d Cir. 1959) (finding that nationwide scope of injunction under 15 U.S.C. § 1072
(1994)). "(Section] 1072 affords nationwide protection to registered marks, regardless of the areas
in which the registrant actually uses the mark." Id.
Note that the term "mark" is not just shorthand for trademark. Trademark includes any word,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof used by a person, or which a person intends
to use, in commerce and applies to register under the Trademark act to identify or distinguish her
goods. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). The term mark encompasses any sign, writing, or ticket put on
manufactured goods to distinguish the goods from others. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 969-70 (6th
ed. 1990).
25. Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 496 (2d
Cir. 1989). The court embraced the proposition that parody is a form of artistic expression
protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 493.
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law recognized the interaction between trademark law and the First
Amendment.26 Concerns regarding the free expression of ideas are real,
especially when one considers the potency of federal trademark law as a
weapon. At the same time, commercial speech is now gaining increased
protection under the United States Constitution.28
Recognizing the need to balance free expression and trademark interests 2 9
Congress incorporated exceptions' into the FTDA that give users of another's
mark more freedom in comparative advertising,3 noncommercial uses, 32 and
news reporting. 33  Although Congress characterized these exceptions as
26. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONsT. amend.
I. National Org. of Young Women's Christian Ass'n v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 335 F.
Supp. 615, 617 (D. S. Car. 1971) (reviewing an argument that granting a religious organization a
trademark violated the establishment clause); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108,
109 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (reviewing a First Amendment defense raised against charges of copyright and
trademark infringement as well as unfair competition for a parody of cartoon characters).
27. Remedies for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act include
injunctions. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(1994). Also included as remedies under the Lanham Act are actual
damages, defendant's profits which may be increased in proper cases by the court, and attorney's
fees and costs in exceptional cases. Id. § 1117 (1994). Being a federal statute, the Lanham Act has
a nationwide scope of remedy. See supra note 24.
28. See infra notes 152-209 and accompanying text. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island,
517 U.S. 484 (1996); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
29. The First Amendment concerns raised by an antidilution statute are legitimate. See 141
CONG. REC. H14,318 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorehead).
30. Uses falling within the exceptions are not actionable under the FTDA. "The following shall
not be actionable under this section . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(C)(4) (Supp. 11995). See infra notes
31-33 and accompanying text.
31. "The following shall not be actionable under this section: (A) Fair use .. . in comparative
commercial advertising. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (Supp. 11995). In comparative advertising,
the advertiser truthfully compares its products to those of a competitor. Filippo M. Cinotti, Fair
Use of Comparative Advertising Under the 1995 Federal Dilution Act, 37 IDEA 133, 138.
32. "The following shall not be actionable under this section: (B) Noncommercial use of a
mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (Supp. 11995). Noncommercial encompasses all speech that is not
commercial. As such, it represents speech not proposing a commercial transaction. See supra note
8.
33. "The following shall not be actionable under this section: (C) All forms of news reporting
and news commentary." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (Supp. 11995). Although the legislative history
is unclear as to the interpretation of a use in news reporting, guidance can be gleaned from Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). In Zacchini, the Court recognized a free
speech interest in showing a film of a daredevil's human cannonball act on the evening news because
it was newsworthy. Id. at 578. Ultimately, the Court found the First Amendment newsworthy
privilege was not required in the specific case. Id. at 578-79. This First Amendment
newsworthiness privilege seems to be the kind of interest contemplated in an exception for news
reporting. An example of the use of a trademark in news reporting would be the use of the
Budweiser trademark in a graphic on the evening television news when discussing Anheuser-Busch
filing a lawsuit against Hangunder for trademark dilution.
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adequate to accommodate First Amendment concerns,' they are not. For
example, while the statute has an exception for noncommercial use, which is
relevant to the commercial purposes that underlie trademark law, 3 drawing a
line between commercial and noncommercial uses is not adequate to determine
which parodic expressions deserve protection. In fact, commercial speech is
gaining recognition as valuable speech protected by the First Amendment.36
Especially considering the importance of free expression in American
jurisprudence, the law should protect expression in a commercial parody and not
allow an oversimplified boundary drawn at commercial speech to jeopardize this
kind of expression.37
Consider again the Hangunder hypothetical. Hangunder's advertisement
certainly proposes a transaction,3" but the advertisement does more than merely
advocate the purchase of a pain reliever, it expresses ideas. Beer drinking can
have significant effects on the drinker in the dreaded "morning after," and, to
the extent that the viewer sees that Hangunder can deal with these effects, she
is better informed in dealing with a hangover. Additionally, the advertisement
comments generally on beer advertisements which portray drinking as a
pleasurable activity without indicating any significant physical consequences.
39
While the commercial quality of a junior use' may be a relevant inquiry,
more salient concerns include the predominant issue of free expression4r ' and
34. "The proposal adequately addresses legitimate first amendment (sic) concerns .... 141
CONG. REc. 519,310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
35. The purpose of trademark law is to preserve the commercial viability and value of a
trademark and prevent confusion of the purchasing public. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying
text.
36. See infra notes 152-209 and accompanying text.
37. The freedom of expression has been called one of the "preeminent rights of Western
democratic theory" and "the touchstone of individual liberty." Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 489 F.
Supp. 763, 769 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (quoting JOH4N E. NOWAK ET AL., HANDBOOK ON
CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 712 (1978)). Also, free speech has been characterized as an "indispensable
condition of nearly every other form of freedom." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
38. Thus, the advertisement qualifies as commercial. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
39. This function of the advertisement makes the Hangunder use a parody because it is
commenting on the trademark it uses. See supra note 9. The Hangunder advertisement is criticizing
Budweiser's portrayal of beer-loving frogs without indicating any detrimental effects of beer drinking
on the characters.
40. A senior user is the first user of a trademark. The junior user is a subsequent user of the
same trademark or an alteration thereof. ROBERT C. DORR & CHRISTOPHER H. MUNCH,
PROTECTING TRADE SECRErS, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, AND TRADEMARKS 122 (2d ed. 1995)
(applying these terms to a fact situation). For example, Budweiser is the senior user of the
trademark frogs, and Hangunder is the junior user of the frog trademark.
41. This is an effort to verbally embody the notion that "the [Lanham] Act should be construed
to apply to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs
the public interest in free expression." Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). See
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the possibly detrimental effects of junior uses on the trademark.42 While the
statutory exceptions are said to adequately address the First Amendment
concerns, the Hangunder hypothetical raises questions as to the effectiveness of
such "bright line" exceptions as are included in the FTDA.43 Thus, these
exceptions should be amended in order to assist judges in properly deciding
trademark parody cases under the new statute. Specifically, the amendment
must allow commercial parodies that have a predominant, expressive component
and which do not seriously harm the trademark.
This Note proposes specific amendments to the exceptions in the FTDA in
order to ensure that the law will properly balance the First Amendment interests
regarding parodic expression and the trademark owners' interests." Section
II briefly discusses the history and philosophy of the Lanham Act,45 the history
and character of the dilution theory and antidilution statutes," and the First
Amendment issues relating to commercial speech and parodies. 7 Section III
analyzes the FTDA's treatment of commercial parodies such as Hangunder's
advertisement. First, Section III reveals that the commercial parody is not likely
to confuse, and, thus, the creator of the parody is not likely to be held liable in
an infringement or unfair competition action.48 Second, it surveys the dilution
cause of action against such commercial speech, and specifically one brought
under the FTDA.49 Finally, Section III juxtaposes FTDA's lack of protection
of commercial parody with the First Amendment's protection of expression.50
In Section IV, the proposed amendments to the FTDA are presented with
justifications based on case law and commentary which will illustrate how the
infra notes 251-58 and accompanying text.
42. A trademark owner has a significant interest in her mark not becoming a generic term. If
a trademark becomes identified with a general product, rather than the source of the product, the
term becomes generic. Such generic terms are not protectible. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 19,
at 89. For example, the term "Popsicle" for frozen treats could lead to this trademark becoming
a generic identification of frozen treats and not the source of particular treats. DORR & MUNCH,
supra note 40, at 121-22.
43. The exceptions of 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(4)(B) (Supp. 11996) were to include "parody, satire,
editorial and other forms of expression that are not a part of a commercial transaction." 141 CONG.
REC. S19,310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch). This overlooks the expressive
interest in a commercial parody, such as that of Hangunder. Few cases have been litigated under
the FTDA, and the single parody case applied the law, in dicta, to a noncommercial parody. Dr.
Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (finding a book
parodying Dr. Seuss and commenting on the O.J. Simpson double murder trial noncommercial even
though sold in bookstores and by mail).
44. See infra section IV.
45. See infra notes 56-78 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 79-151 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 152-258 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 263-319 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 320-50 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 351-96 and accompanying text.
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proposed amendments would apply to the Hangunder hypothetical and similar
expressive, but commercial, parodies.5
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
To fully appreciate the balance of issues at stake in a commercial trademark
parody, it is useful to consider the developments in the various bodies of law
that are implicated. While trademark use and the traditional infringement and
unfair competition actions protecting these marks have long histories,5"
dilution is a relatively new theory of trademark protection." When a
trademark is pirodied in another party's advertisement, the First Amendment
commercial speech doctrine is implicated. 4 Also under the First Amendment
doctrine, parodies are recognized as a unique subset of expressions deserving
special attention."
A. The Lanham Act and Trademark Law
For over 4,000 years, people have used symbols to identify the source of
goods.56 Governments became involved in trademark protection because the
public has an interest in furthering the commercial goals and public benefits
served by such trademarks.57 Trademark law serves two goals: (1) it protects
the public from confusion and provides the public with a solid foundation for
making purchasing decisions;58 and (2) it protects the trademark owner's
property rights in her trademark.59 These property rights derive from the
trademark's ability to further the owner's business by identifying goods as being
from the trademark owner. 60
51. See infra notes 397-437 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 56-78 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 79-151 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 152-209 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 210-58 and accompanying text.
56. S.A. Diamond, The HistoricalDevelopment of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265,266
(1975).
57. Trademarks are valuable to the public as a means of increasing the reliability of purchases.
To the extent that a customer can identify a good with a particular source, consumer confidence and
satisfaction are increased, bolstering the economy generally. Trademarks are also valuable to the
manufacturers for facilitating marketing efforts and creating product identification. MICHAEL A.
EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 7.01 [B] (3d ed. 1995).
58. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 1 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274.
59. Id.
60. See EPSTEIN, supra note 57, § 7.01[11.
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In American law, these goals were originally pursued through unfair
competition laws. 6 The unfair competition cases emphasized the injustice that
results from one manufacturer marketing her product on the reputation built by
another manufacturer. 2  These statutory protections against trademark
infringement also acted to prevent trademark uses that intentionally or otherwise
misled the public.' Presently, the Lanham Act,' which finds its
constitutional basis in the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution,'
provides federal protection for trademarks from unfair competition and other
abuses.
The law has struggled to keep up with increases in trademark use. As
America has grown, the use of trademarks has become more widespread and
frequent.' By 1946, when the Lanham Act was passed, the use and reliance
on trademarks to identify goods had become notably broader than when the
nation was born.67 This use and reliance was a result of a flood of new goods
into the economy requiring trademarks to help consumers identify the source of
goods. Manufacturers relied more on their trademarks to identify their goods
to consumers, and trademark litigation increased as trademark owners sought to
protect their trademarks from uses by others.' Today's technological advances
in mass communication, mass marketing, and transportation mean that even
more goods are found in more markets, and goods may be sold at an even
greater remove, spatially or otherwise, from their manufacturers. With this
increased distance, consumers rely even more heavily on trademarks to identify
61. Beverly W. Pattishall, Two Hundred Years of American Trademark Law, in TwO HUNDRED
YEARS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW 51, 58 (1977).
62. This is analogous to the second goal of trademark. See supra notes 59-60 and
accompanying text.
63. Pattishall, supra note 61, at 58 (citing R. COX, MANUAL OF TRADEMARK CASES 27-28 (2d
ed. 1892)).
64. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. 1 1996).
65. "[The Congress shall have Power] [tlo regulate Commerce .. . among the several States
..... "U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. While earlier statutory protections were based in the patent
and copyright clause of the U.S. Constitution, they were struck down for being an unconstitutional
extension of the clause's endowment of congressional power. Pattishall, supra note 61, at 60.
Federal Patent and Copyright laws are founded on the so-called patent and copyright clause. "[The
Congress shall have Power] [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also DORR & MUNCH, supra note 40, at 167,
251.
66. See Frank I. Schechter, Fog and Fiction in Trademark Protection, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 60,
69 (1936). See also Pattishall, supra note 61, at 61. During the second century of American
trademark law, a noticeable progression occurred in the American economy from an agrarian base
to a more industrial one. Id. Such change involved an expansion in commercial products and trade.
Id.
67. See Pattishall, supra note 61, at 67.
68. Id. at 67-68.
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the goods of a particular manufacturer so as to give the consumer some insight
into the source of the goods she is considering buying.69
To accomplish the dual goals of trademark law, the Lanham Act protected
against the infringement of registered distinctive trademarks and against the use
of trademarks in unfair competition.7' Trademarks must be distinctive, 71 for
their distinctiveness is what makes them valuable to their owners.' In both
infringement and unfair competition actions, liability is imposed when the use
is likely to confuse consumers as to the source of goods. 3  Under the
provisions of the Lanham Act prior to the FTDA, the only parodic uses that
were actionable were those that potentially confused the consuming public.
Courts use a multi-factored test to determine whether the public is likely to
be confused. These factors are called the Polaroid factors, so named after their
use in Polaroid, Corp. v. Polarad, Electronics Corp.74 These considerations
focus on the nature of the senior trademark and the nature of the junior use, as
well as market factors which may reflect on whether the public would likely be
confused.75 While courts will consider evidence of actual confusion in this
analysis, it is not dispositive.76
69. Mass merchandising to national markets stemming from technological advances in radio and
television increased the need for labels and packaging, thus expanding the economic significance of
trademarks for commercial identification. Id. at 67.
70. "Any person who shall . . . use ... a registered mark ... in connection with . . . any
goods or services . . . with which such use is likely to cause confusion . . . shall be liable." 15
U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994 & Supp. 1 1996). "Any person who . . . uses in commerce any . . .
symbol . . . which-(A) is likely to cause confusion." Id. § 1125(a)(1).
71. Id. § 1052(0 (requiring distinctiveness). Distinctiveness is the ability of the trademark to
identify the source of the good to which the trademark is applied. See also DoRR & MUNCH, supra
note 40, at 105 (stating that distinctiveness is an important factor in the legal strength of a trademark
and maximizes the owner's right to stop infringing uses). For a discussion of the strength of a
mark, see infra notes 266-71 and accompanying text.
72. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 19, at 81 (stating that a trademark is used to identify the
owner's goods and distinguish them from the goods of others).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(a)-(b) (1994 & Supp. 1 1996). See supra note 70.
74. 287 F.2d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 1963).
75. The Polaroid factors are: (1) strength of plaintiffs trademark; (2) similarity of the
trademarks; (3) similarity of the goods; (4) similarity of channels of trade; (5) similarity of
advertising; (6) intent of the defendant; (7) actual confusion; (8) the sophistication of purchasers.
Id. at 495. In section III, these factors will be discussed in more detail as they relate to parody.
See infra notes 263-319 and accompanying text.
76. Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 1988) (involving use of
trademark "GUNG-HO" to describe action figure of plaintiff and to identify the defendant's entire
line of similar action figures). See infra notes 296-301 and accompanying text.
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In January 1996, the FTDA was added to the Lanham Act." The FTDA
significantly departs from prior federal trademark protection in that it does not
require the traditional likelihood of confusion test.78 To better understand the
reasons for creating such a cause of action, it is useful to consider the history
of antidilution laws.
B. The Dilution Theory of Trademark Protection
In 1742, England's Judge Hawthorne declared that no reason existed for
allowing an action against uses of another's trademark that might tend to
decrease the distinctiveness or dilute the trademark. However, since then, much
has changed. 9 In 1947, Massachusetts became the first state to recognize such
a claim as a matter of statutory right when it enacted an antidilution law.W°
This antidilution law, like others that followed, was designed to protect the
trademark owner's value in the trademark's distinctiveness.8 Since 1947,
many states' have added an antidilution cause of action by statute, an
enactment typically based on section 12 of the Model State Trademark Bill.83
These state statutes generally protect only trademarks registered in the state.'
Some of the states, however, protect any trademark found to be strong or
famous.a Experts have suggested that antidilution laws are one of the most
77. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. 1 1996).
78. "The purpose of H.R. 1295 is to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur
the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it even in the absence of a likelihood of
confusion." H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 2 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1029
(emphasis added).
79. Miles J. Alexander, Dilution-A Blessing or a Curse? What Is It? How Do You Prove It?
How Does It Fit in with Traditional Trademark Law?, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: TRADEMARKS,
UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND COPYRIGHTS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND OTHER SELECTED ISSUES
(1994).
80. Id. See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. lI0B, § 12 (West 1990).
81. The underlying theory is that the more distinct a trademark is, the more impact it has on
the public consciousness, and the more it needs to be protected. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational
Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 825 (1927).
82. At the time of the drafting of the FTDA, approximately 25 states had their own antidilution
statute. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030. See
supra note 19.
83. DORIS E. LONG, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE LANHAM ACT 335 (1993). Compare id.
("Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark
registered under this Act, or a mark valid at common law, or a trade name valid at common law,
shall be grounds for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties
or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services") (quoting section 12 of the Model
State Trademark Bill), with supra note 23 (text of various state antidilution statutes and FTDA).
84. LONG, supra note 83, at 335.
85. Id. at 336. A trademark's strength is measured by its ability to identify its source. For a
discussion of the strength of a trademark, see infra notes 266-71 and accompanying text. The FTDA
lists factors to use in assessing whether a mark is strong or famous:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
Pearson: Commercial Trademark Parody, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act,
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1998
986 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 32
potent weapons trademark owners may have to protect their trademarks.' Due
in no small part to this potency, courts were reluctant to apply these laws for
many years."
Antidilution laws arose to provide legal protection against another's use of
one's trademark on noncompeting, unrelated goods.' These laws were
designed not to protect against consumer confusion, but to protect owners
against the gradual diluting of the identity of their trademark. 89  Because
trademarks must be distinctive to receive infringement protection, antidilution
laws serve as a means to protect the distinctiveness so as to preserve claims
against future infringers as well as to maintain the trademark's ability to identify
the source of goods in an increasingly diverse commercial market.'
However, dilution does not simply protect the distinctiveness of trademarks.
Trademarks help to identify the source of goods, thereby giving consumers an
association upon which to base their decisions whether to purchase goods.91
If a trademark has a strong consumer reputation, the association will probably
be more positive, and the likelihood of a purchase based on the reputation will
increase. 92 Thus, dilution may also result from uses that are likely to damage
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or
services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade
used by the mark's owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of
February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. I 1996).
86. Alexander, supra note 79, at 10.
87. Id. at 9.
88. Id. at 8. "[A] merchant may have a sufficient economic interest in the use of his mark
outside the field of his own exploitation to justify interposition by a court." Yale Elec. Corp. v.
Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).
89. Dilution theory envisions another's use of one's mark as a "whittling away or dispersion
of the identity" of the mark. Schechter, supra note 81, at 825.
90. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030 (dilution
of distinctiveness is equated with lessening the capacity to identify and distinguish goods).
91. S. REP. No. 79-1333, at I (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274 (noting that
trademarks are used so that buyers favorably know that they will get the product they are asking for
and want to get).
92. GREGORY Er AL., supra note 19, at 114-15 (noting that the public expects to see famous
trademarks used in connection with a variety of products and will assume that the mark must be
affiliated with the same source that produces the goods usually connected with the mark).
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a trademark's association and reputation; this is tarnishment of the trademark.93
It may be helpful to step back and analyze the theoretical underpinnings of
antidilution laws. While dilution is primarily a recent legislative trend, its
theoretical development began in 1927.' Dilution' refers to the diminishing
of a trademark's marketing value,9 which may occur in one of at least two
ways.' The first way is through blurring,98 and this is essentially what Frank
Schechter first identified as the gradual whittling away of a trademark's
identity.' Blurring has been characterized as a use that does not necessarily
confuse the consumer, but lessens the uniqueness of the subject mark such that
the strong senior trademark becomes weak. " Protection against such use is
necessary because a trademark's value lies in its selling power which depends
on its uniqueness which can be vitiated by disparate uses on other goods. 0'
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETmON § 25 cmt.a. (1995). See infra notes 123-
29 and accompanying text.
94. See Schechter, supra note 81.
95. Both sides of the senior and junior user battle criticize antidilution statutes. Those favoring
junior users say antidilution overprotects trademarks, resulting in a monopolization of language
through the prohibition of unauthorized uses of symbols. Milton W. Handler, Are the State
Antidilution Laws Compatible With the National Protection of Trademarks?, 75 TRADEMARK REP.
269, 278 (1985). Those favoring senior users, however, relying on the perceived property
characteristics of trademarks, believe that any interference with this property should be actionable
and that, even with dilution, trademark owner's have insufficient protection. See, e.g., Jerry B.
Swam & Theodore H. Davis, Dilution, an Idea Whose ime Has Gone; Brand Equity As Protectable
Property, the New/Old Paradigm, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 219 (1994).
96. David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REV. 531, 531-32
(1991).
97. Dilution may not be limited to these two distinct classes of uses. One case indicates that
uses attracting attention to one's own product by poking fun at another's risk dilution although the
use may not be unwholesome or blur the distinctiveness of the senior mark. Deere & Co. v. MTD
Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43-4 (2d Cir. 1994).
98. The term "blurring" has been used in several cases. See, e.g., Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at
43; Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th Cir. 1987); Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 746 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1984); Sally Gee, Inc. v.
Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 626 (2d Cir. 1983); Starter Corp. v. Converse, Inc., No. 95-Civ.-
3678, 1996 WL 684165 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1996); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd.,
625 F. Supp. 48, 56 (D.N.M. 1985).
99. Schechter, supra note 81, at 825.
100. American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Lab. Corp., No. 87-Civ.-8840, 1989 WL
39679, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1989) (citing Community Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Orondorff,
678 F.2d 1034, 1037 (1 th Cir. 1982)). See infra notes 266-71 and accompanying text (discussing
the strength of a mark).
101. These principles undergird Schechter's concepts of dilution. Schechter, supra note 81,
at 831. The "owner of these marks should not have to stand by and watch diminution in their value
as a result of unauthorized uses by others." Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124,
135 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
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As an example, American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Laboratories,
Corp.It" involved dilution of a trademark by blurring."' 3  In American
Express, the defendant modeled a condom package after the plaintiffs trademark
credit cards. "4 In addition to imitating the trademarked card design, the
defendant parodied the plaintiff's trademark phrase, "Don't leave home without
it," by using "Never leave home without it."" °  The plaintiff sought relief
under New York's antidilution statute.'0 6 The court construed the statute as
preventing the use of a trademark on dissimilar products or services to feed on
the business reputation of an established trademark. 10 Because the defendant
had applied the junior trademark to a product so dissimilar from the product of
the senior trademark that confusion did not exist, and because the use lessened
the uniqueness of the senior trademark, the court held that the antidilution statute
was applicable. 10
The second way that dilution occurs is through loss of business
reputation,'" which has two prongs: inferior association"i0  and
tarnishment."' Most trademark parodies, by nature, ridicule the subject
102. No. 87-Civ.-8840, 1989 WL 39679 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1989) (granting an injunction
against a condom package parody of credit card trademarks under the New York state antidilution
statute).
103. Tarnishment may be implicated in such cases as well due to the overlapping nature of the
two concepts. For a discussion of tarnishment and associated loss of reputation claims, see infra
notes 109-129 and accompanying text.
104. American Express, 1989 WL 39679, at *1.
105. Id.
106. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1996).
107. American Express, 1989 WL 39679, at *8.
108. American Express, Co. v. Vibra Approved Lab., Corp., 1989 WL 39679, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing Community Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Orondorff, 678 F.2d 1034, 1037
(11 th Cir. 1982)). Evidence of third party imitations of the defendants' use persuaded the court that
the defendants' advertising had the potential to whittle away the distinctiveness of American Express'
trademarks. Id. at *9.
109. Arlen W. Langvardt, Protected Marks and Protected Speech: Establishing the First
Amendment Boundaries in Trademark Parody Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1, 35 (1991).
110. This involves applying the trademark to inferior goods. Such an application threatens the
trademark's reputation and, thus, value by causing the public to associate plaintiffs trademark with
the lesser quality of the defendant's goods. Langvardt, supra note 109, at 36. See infra notes 111-
22 and accompanying text.
111. This term has been used broadly in many cases. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods.,
Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1994); Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48,
57 (D.N.M. 1985); Pillsbury v. Milky Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124,135 (N.D. Ga. 1981). The
term applies to the use of the senior trademark in an unwholesome context. Langvardt, supra note
109, at 36. "Unwholesome" may include uses that create an undesirable, unwholesome, or unsavory
mental association by the public with the plaintiffs trademark. Jordache Enters., 625 F. Supp. at
57. See infra notes 123-36 and accompanying text.
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trademark,"' and ridicule, by definition, is derisive"' and likely to cause
negative associations similar to tarnishment. Courts have increasingly used the
doctrine of dilution to enjoin tarnishment,"' and, in parody cases, courts have
most frequently relied on the tarnishment theory of dilution."'
First, consider the inferior association prong of dilution. Sally Gee, Inc.
v. Myra Hogan, Inc."6 illustrates a failed attempt to apply the inferior
association branch of the loss of business reputation." 7 In Sally Gee, Inc., the
defendant, a clothing manufacturer, used a trademark on its own line of ladies'
sweaters that was similar to the plaintiffs trademark, which it used on women's
clothing."' However, in this case, no dilution occurred because the junior
user applied the similar trademark to superior products. Had the junior user
applied the similar trademark to inferior products, the use would have resulted
in a loss of business reputation. More simply, the trademark suffered no harm
to its reputation by its application to clothes which were better than the clothes
to which it was usually applied.
Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc."9 involved another formulation of
inferior association; reverse inferior association. Reverse inferior association
occurs when the junior user alters the senior trademark, potentially injuring the
112. David H. Bernstein & Bruce P. Keller, As Satiric as They Wanna Be: Parody Lawsuits
Under Copyright, Trademark, Dilution and Publicity Laws, 416 P.L.I. PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 1161, 1173-74 (1995).
113. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1014 (1989).
114. Welkowitz, supra note 96, at 551.
115. Bernstein & Keller, supra note 112, at 173. It should be noted that tarnishment has its
limits. Many courts strictly construe the notion of placement in an unwholesome context, and many
distasteful uses have been found not to tarnish. See, e.g., Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld
Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48 (D.N.M. 1985) (holding that a modification of the Jordache name and horse's
head trademark into "Lardashe" and a pig's face for large sized women's jeans found not to tarnish);
Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding the
application of Johnny Carson's name to portable toilets not tarnishing to his trademark "Here's
Johnny" quip); Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 645 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding a
modification of the Godzilla trademark as applied to trash bags not tarnishing); Girl Scouts of the
United States v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (finding the use
of the Girl Scout uniform in a teen pregnancy poster not tarnishing to the trademark uniform).
116. 699 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1983).
117. In other words, inferior association is one way to cause the loss of business reputation.
118. Sally Gee, Inc., 699 F.2d at 622-23. The plaintiffs case failed because the defendant's
goods were of a superior quality, creating no inferior association. Id. at 625.
119. 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding dilution in a case involving the alteration of the
plaintiff's trademark in the defendant's advertisement to make the deer trademark look timid,
confused, and weak). The implication was that the lawn tractors represented by the timid looking
deer trademark were inferior lawn tractors. Id. at 45.
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reputation of the product associated with the senior trademark."0 In Deere &
Co., a competitor lawn tractor company made an animated commercial wherein
the competitor's tractor frightened the Deere & Co.'s trademarked deer which
leapt away in fear.' The court reasoned that the alteration of the trademark
deer destroyed the reputation of the products and the positive associations
between the trademark and the products and made the products appear ridiculous
and weak." Thus, the court enjoined the junior user from damaging the
product reputation by impugning the trademark.
Second, business reputation may also be injured by tarnishment, as
illustrated in Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Products, Inc. ,23 the quintessential
case of the tarnishment branch of the loss of business reputation prong of
dilution. 24 In Pillsbury Co., the defendant published, in its adult magazine,
a picture of the plaintiffs trademarked "Poppin' Fresh" and "Poppie Fresh"
characters," who in this depiction were engaging in sexual intercourse and
fellatio.2 6  Pursuant to Georgia's antidilution statute, 27 the court granted
Pillsbury an injunction, finding that using the trademarks in a depraved
context 2 would likely injure the commercial reputation of the trademarks.129
In a sense, these dilution theories'o conceive of the trademark as property
with traditional property rights.' Thus, any use which would lessen the
property's value is then actionable conceptually as a trespass to the
property. 3 2  Traditionally, the rationale for granting trademark monopoly
protection was founded in the public interest in preventing confusion,13
120. This case has been widely criticized for expanding the scope of the dilution theory. See,
e.g., Cinotti, supra note 31, at 155-56 (calling the decision flawed and paradoxical as well as
dangerous for not complying with proper application of the First Amendment).
121. Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 41.
122. Id. at 45.
123. 215 U.S.P.Q. 124 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
124. Tarnishment is another branch of loss of business reputation because by tarnishing the
associations of another's trademark that other's business reputation is presumably injured.
125. These characters adorned Pillsbury product labels, such as Pillsbury Cinnamon Rolls.
Pillsbury, Co., 215 U.S.P.Q. at 126.
126. Id. at 125-26.
127. GA. CODE ANN. § 106-15 (1981).
128. Pillsbury, Co., 215 U.S.P.Q. at 135.
129. Pillsbury v. Milky Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 135 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
130. These theories are blurring and loss of business reputation by inferior association (normal
or reverse) or by tarnishment. See supra notes 98-129 and accompanying text.
131. Welkowitz, supra note 96, at 531-32.
132. Id. at 535. See also Beverly Pattishall, Dawning Acceptance of the Dilution Rationale for
Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 289, 309-10 (1984).
133. In the context of patents, at least, such a monopoly of intellectual property has been
characterized as an embarrassment that requires justification. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
1, 10-11 (1966).
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which is the rationale for infringement and unfair competition actions. '3 One
must consider whether the only interest is the owner's property right or whether
a public interest is implicated.'36
Under the dilution theory, trademarks are a sort of commercial magnet that,
by their identification of their sources, draw consumers to certain goods.' 137
Loss of this commercial magnetism represents injury to trademark owners, and
antidilution statutes make this actionable.' It is significant that this implies
a property value in the trademark similar to other real and personal property
rights.'39 While the concept of a property value in a trademark is relatively
novel, the United States Supreme Court in San Francisco Athletic Ass'n v.
United States Olympic Committee approved of the concept, in the limited context
of a statutory grant of a property right in a trademark.'4
Regardless of the way in which dilution occurs, antidilution laws generally
provide only injunctive relief. 4 ' This is consistent with the goal of
antidilution laws which is to prevent uses that diminish a trademark's
distinctiveness. Once the loss is incurred, no amount of money can replace the
trademark's distinctiveness.
134. Welkowitz, supra note 96, at 531-32.
135. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
136. Schechter's principle is that the value of the trademark lies in its uniqueness and is vitiated
by disparate uses. Schechter, supra note 81, at 831. The resolution is dependent on whether one
considers this principle from the standpoint of the value to the consumer or the value to the
trademark owner. The trademark is valuable to the consumer as a means to identify the source of
goods and valuable to the trademark owner as a marketing tool. EPSTEIN, supra note 57, § 7.01 [B].
137. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge, Co., 316 U.S. 203,205 (1942)
(referring to the drawing power of good trademark).
138. "If another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of symbols he has created, the owner
can obtain legal redress." Id. at 205.
139. Alexander, supra note 79, at 9.
140. 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (finding that the U.S. Olympic Committee could protect the term
"olympic" from being used by another group to promote its athletic event). This was not a
trademark dilution case but merely illustrates the amenability of the Court to the notion of property
rights in a trademark.
141. Don A. Proudfoot, Jr., Common Law Trademark Infringement, Trademark Dilution and
Lanham Act--Section 43(a), 217 PLI/PAT 29, 49 (1986). While trademark law has its historical
antecedents in the courts of law, as opposed to those of equity, and generally has been considered
subject only to money damages, the merger of equity and law courts justified this introduction of
injunctive remedies. Alexander, supra note 79, at 5.
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To establish the forbidden whittling away, one need not show actual loss
of distinctiveness, but a likelihood of dilution. 42 This likelihood can often be
shown by a simple similarity of the trademarks.'43 This standard for
protection is considerably lower than the likelihood of confusion standard for an
infringement action causing dilution to be characterized as a viable option where
an infringement action fails.44
A third party may use another's trademark in several different ways. First,
one may use another's trademark as a trademark for one's own goods.'
41
Additionally, a third party may commercially use a trademark to refer to the
goods of the trademark's owner. 46  Also, one may use the trademark to
symbolically express criticism or humor by using the trademark or an alteration
of it as a parody. In a parody, the original trademark is invoked in order to
make some further comment about the trademark,"4  its owner, 48 its
goods, 149 its associations, 5  or even something seemingly unrelated to the
trademark. ''
142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETImON § 25(l)(a) (1995) (stating the cause of
action to be for uses "likely to cause a reduction in that distinctiveness"). See also id. § 25(l)(b)
(stating the cause of action for uses "likely to . . . tarnish the images associated with the other's
mark"); id. § 25 cmt.f.
143. LONG, supra note 83, at 336. See, e.g., Augusta Nat'l, Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 193 U.S.P.Q. 210, 222 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (using the name means there is a reasonable
certainty that the value of the plaintiff's trademark will be eroded).
144. Proudfoot, supra note 141, at 48.
145. Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (enjoining
defendant from marketing diaper bags under the trademark "Gucchi Goo" because of confusion with
the "Gucci" trademark).
146. This would be comparative advertising. See supra note 31.
147. General Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1036 (D. Mass. 1979) (enjoining
defendant' from depicting General Electric trademark as "Genital Electric" monogram applied to
clothing).
148. Reddy Communications, Inc. v. Environmental Action Found., 477 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C.
1979) (involving defendant who published caricature of cartoon mascot of plaintiff utility to portray
the utility in a negative light).
149. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994) (enjoining
humor magazine from running fake advertisement wherein plaintiff's beer is implied to be made with
water from an oil polluted river).
150. Girl Scouts of the United States v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (refusing to grant injunction against poster depicting pregnant girl in Girl Scouts
uniform and the phrase "be prepared").
151. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987) (involving use of
insurance company logo to comment on nuclear holocaust).
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C. Commercial Speech and the First Amendment
In 1976, the Supreme Court' acknowledged that the First Amendment
provides at least some protection to commercial speech. 5 3 Prior decisions by
the Supreme Court indicated that the First Amendment did not protect
commercial speech. 54 While the Court recognized that governments may
regulate commercial speech because commercial speech is particularly robust
and unlikely to be chilled by appropriate regulations,"' the Court also
recognized that a shift had occurred in its First Amendment jurisprudence and
that commercial speech should receive some level of protection.15 6 The Court
declared that determining First Amendment protection on the basis of its
classification as commercial or noncommercial speech had fallen into disfavor
and disuse.' In Virginia State Board,- the Court presented a new question,
because the previous cases involved speech which was not purely
commercial. 8
In defining the constitutional interest in commercial speech, the Court
remarked that expression would not lose its protected status simply because of
its economic nature, that is, because money was spent to create it, because it
152. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
153. "There can be no question that in past decisions the Court has given some indication that
commercial speech is unprotected." Id. at 758. The case involved a particular Virginia regulation
prohibiting licensed pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices. Id. at 752. This
regulation had been reviewed and upheld by courts under Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and
Equal Protection challenges. Id. at 753. See, e.g., Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp.
821 (W.D. Va. 1969). The state regulated pharmacists pursuant to the state's public interest in
health and safety implicated by practice of the profession. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 750-51.
Consumers of prescription drugs raised a First Amendment challenge alleging that they were entitled
to receive information regarding prescription drug prices in advertisements from pharmacists. Id.
154. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 758. See also supra note 153. See, e.g., Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (upholding conviction for violation of door-to-door solicitation
prohibition); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (upholding a New York statute
prohibiting commercial handbill distribution in the street).
155. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
156. "M[The notion of unprotected 'commercial speech' all but passed from the scene [in recent
commercial speech cases]." Id. at 759 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)).
157. Id. at 758. The distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech was avoided
in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm 'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), even though it involved
"classic examples of commercial speech." Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 385.
158. The new question was whether the proposition of a commercial transaction was so far
removed from the expression of ideas that it merited no protection. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S.
at 762. Previous cases, unlike the advertisement in Virginia State Board, "did more than simply
propose a commercial transaction." Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822 (involving the circulation of
advertisement of availability of abortions in New York).
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was in a form sold for profit, or because it solicited money.'59 -The Court
reasoned that the First Amendment did not only protect political speech.' t"
In fact, the Court noted that the public may have a greater interest in the flow
of commercial information than in most political debate. 6' Rather than
assuming that advertising is inherently harmful because people may be mislead
or may experience difficulty in interpreting it, the Court pursued a less
paternalistic approach that would encourage the dissemination of information and
thus facilitate decision-making. 62 Thus, the Court declared that the First
Amendment interest is in the communication itself, vesting in both the source
and recipient of commercial speech. 63 As a result of this Supreme Court
decision, government bodies may not create a wholesale ban on true,
nonmisleading advertising.
However, government bodies still have many avenues open by which they
may pursue regulation of commercial speech after Virginia State Board.
Specifically, the Court recognized the power to restrict the truthful advertising
of legal activities under the traditional time, place, or manner regulations."6
Similarly, state actors may prohibit false or misleading advertisements and
advertisements for illegal transactions."' s The Court also recognized that the
regulation of advertisements in the electronic broadcast media is subject to less
stringent review. 166
In order to allow meaningful application of these First Amendment
principles, this new protection of commercial speech needed structure. In
159. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
761 (1976). See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 35-59 (1976) (involving paid advertisement);
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959) (involving books as speech sold for profit); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940) (soliciting monetary contribution).
160. "Purely factual matter of public interest may claim protection." Virginia State Bd., 425
U.S. at 762.
161. Id. at 763. The Court especially noted the interest of the poor in making an informed
decision as to how best to allocate their meager funds. Id.
162. Id. at 770. The Court rejected the philosophy of protecting the public by keeping it
ignorant of the lawful terms of commercial competitors. Id.
163. Id. at 756. "If there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the
advertising. . . ." Id. at 757. This right in the recipient is not limited to situations where other
sources of information are not available, though that was the particular situation in Virginia State
Bd. Id. at 757 n.15.
164. Id. at 771.
165. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
772 (1976).
166. Id. at 773. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding
access regulations for broadcasting). Broadcast media implicated the additional government interest
raised by the "scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Government's role in allocating those
frequencies, and the legitimate claims of those unable without government assistance to gain access
to those frequencies for expression of their views. . . ." Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 400.
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Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,67 the
Court reviewed a New York Public Service Commission ban on advertisements
that promote the use of electricity. I" The Commission had passed the
regulation during a fuel crisis when the available fuel was inadequate to meet the
demands that were heightened by marketing. 16 Central Hudson, a public
utility, sued the Commission claiming that the regulation violated the First
Amendment, especially considering the fact that the fuel shortage had
ceased. 170
In Central Hudson, the regulation banned only commercial expression.' 7
The Court noted that the First Amendment protects commercial speech from
unwarranted government regulation in order to further the societal interest in the
greatest dissemination of truthful information. '" The Court declared that the
First Amendment interest is only concerned with these informational aspects of
the commercial speech,." Thus, commercial speech may be regulated, within
certain boundaries, because the commercial speaker is in a position to know the
truth about the products discussed in the advertisements and limit her speech to
that which is truthful and nonmisleading.' 7' The profit motive of commercial
speech makes it particularly hardy and unlikely to be chilled by appropriate
regulations. 75
The Central Hudson Court articulated a four part test that would delineate
the boundaries to commercial speech regulation. 76 This four part test may be
reorganized into a two step analysis. In the first step, a court must review the
regulated speech to determine whether the speech receives constitutional
protection. Only speech that involves lawful activity and is not misleading will
receive constitutional protection. " The remaining three parts of the Central
Hudson test constitute the second step of analysis, and in this step, a court will
167. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
168. Id. at 558.
169. Id. at 559. The Commission had declared all promotional advertisements for energy
consumption contrary to the national policy of conserving energy. Id.
170. Id. at 559.
171. Id. at 561. Promotional advertisements are "related solely to the economic interests of
the speaker and its audience." Id.
172. Id. at 561-62 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 363-64 (1977)). The
Court noted that this policy values some accurate information over none at all. Central Hudson, 447
U.S. at 562.
173. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)
("there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not
accurately inform the public of lawful activity").
174. Id. at 564 n.6.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 564.
177. Id. at 566. This is the first part of the Central Hudson four part test.
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analyze the government's conduct in creating the regulation. The government's
interest must be substantial, 7 ' and the regulation must directly advance this
substantial interest ' 9 and must not be more extensive than necessary.'O
Recently, in 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, the Supreme Court again
reviewed the First Amendment protection of commercial speech. 8 ' Although
the Court was unanimous in its judgment, it was divided in its reasoning.'n
Apart from the effect of the Twenty-First Amendment on government regulation
of speech regarding alcohol sales,"8 3 a majority of the Court could only reach
agreement on one substantive issue-the regulation violated the First
Amendment.'84
178. Id. at 566. The asserted state interests of energy conservation and fair electricity rates
were deemed substantial. Id. at 568-69. This is part two of the Central Hudson test.
179. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
The relation of an advertising ban to maintenance of fair electrical rates was deemed "tenuous" at
best. Id. at 569. However, the regulation did directly advance the state interest in conservation by
not allowing the active encouragement of demand. Id. This is the third part of the Central Hudson
test.
180. Id. at 566. The advertising ban was not tailored narrowly enough to the state interest in
conservation. Id. at 570. The regulation affected communications not tending to increase
consumption. Id. This, more generally, indicates that the regulation affected speech not solely on
the basis of the asserted interest. Additionally, a more limited restriction might have furthered the
state interest. Id. In particular, the Court noted that a simple regulation of the format or content
of advertisements, rather than a complete ban may have been as effective to achieve the state
interest. Id. at 571. This is the fourth, and final, part of the Central Hudson test.
181. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996). In 1956, Rhode Island issued regulations prohibiting the
advertisement of alcohol prices. Id. at 1501. The plaintiff, 44 Liquormart, challenged the
regulation under the First Amendment after being fined $400 for publishing a flier with pictures of
bottles of Vodka and Rum and the word "WOW!" printed next to them, implying their low price.
Id. at 1502-03.
182. Stevens, J., announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered the opinion of the Court
with respects to Parts I, II, and VII, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ.,
joined, the opinion of the Court with respect to Part VIII, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and
Ginsburg, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Parts III and V, in which Kennedy, Souter, and
Ginsburg, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Part VI, in which Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg,
JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part IV, in which Kennedy and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.
Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
O'Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and Souter
and Breyer, JJ., joined. Id. at 1500-01.
Generally, this analysis is divided into two schools of thought. The first is represented by the
parts (III, IV, V, VI) authored by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, and
occasionally by Justices Thomas and Souter. The second is represented by Justice O'Connor's
concurrence, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Breyer and Souter, and agreed to by default
in Justice Scalia's concurrence. Id. at 1515-20.
183. See Part VII of Justice Stevens' opinion. Id. at 1514-15.
184. Id. at 1515.
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The separately filed opinions in 44 Liquormart presented four general
viewpoints on commercial speech. Justice Stevens, and those joining him,
decided to apply the Central Hudson test with "special care.' Justice Scalia
preferred to consider the law of commercial speech as of the time the First
Amendment was ratified."s Lacking evidence on point, Justice Scalia favored
the standard application of the Central Hudson test."s  Justice Thomas
considered the ban on the nonmisleading advertisement of a legal activity to be
legislated public ignorance, and thus the ban was per se illegitimate, and no
further analysis was required. 88 Finally, Justice O'Connor, and those joining
her, favored a straight application of the Central Hudson test with no "special
care. " '89 Among the numerous opinions, the opinions of Justice Stevens and
Justice O'Connor represent the two main analyses.
In his "special care" analysis, Justice Stevens would add another layer to
the commercial speech protection recognized in Central Hudson. This analysis
begins by recognizing that commercial speech may properly be subject to some
regulation because it is hardy and more objectively verifiable than other forms
of speech." 9  Government, though, has less regulatory authority over the
substance of the information in commercial speech than in the commercial form
of it.' 9' This is because of the interest in protecting commercial speech for
the sake of the free flow of commercial information," which would be
undermined if this flow were polluted with misleading messages. 93
Regulations beyond this interest in keeping consumers informed which entirely
suppress commercial speech' are subject to an application of the Central
Hudson test with "special care."" 9s Still, commercial speech that either is
misleading or regards illegal activity receives no protection. 9
185. See infra notes 190-204 and accompanying text.
186. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
188. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
189. See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
190. 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1506 (1996).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1505.
193. Id.
194. Complete bans on speech, such as Rhode Island's ban on all advertising of liquor prices,
"all but foreclose alternative means of disseminating certain information." Id. at 1507. In fact, in
his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas characterized a complete ban on truthful advertising of a
legal activity as legislated ignorance entitling the speech to full constitutional protection and
eschewing the protection of government restrictions that is offered by the Central Hudson test. Id.
at 1515-16. This legislated ignorance was "per se illegitimate." Id. at 1516. Justice Thomas "[did]
not see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting that 'commercial' speech is of 'lower value'
than 'noncommercial' speech." Id. at 1518.
195. Id. at 1508.
196. 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1505 (1996).
Pearson: Commercial Trademark Parody, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act,
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1998
998 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32
Under this analysis, the classification of the expression, i.e., as
commercial, noncommerical, or political, is not the only factor a court should
consider in determining the constitutional issue.1" A court must also review
the regulation's purpose to determine whether it exists for the same reasons that
constitutional protection is even provided to commercial speech (that is, to
ensure consumers get full, but accurate information).198 If so, the scrutiny of
the regulation will be less strict.'99 However, if the regulation is not designed
to preserve a fair bargaining process, then a court will subject the restrictions
on speech to a strict standard under the First Amendment.2 "°
According to Justice Stevens, Rhode Island's regulation failed the "special
care" standard of heightened scrutiny." While Rhode Island's asserted
interest in temperance might be substantial,2" the ban did not directly advance
this interest to the extent required by the "special care" analysis.2'o
Additionally, the regulation was considered to be more extensive than necessary
to advance the government interest because alternative forms of regulation were
available that would have promoted the state's interest without so broadly
restricting speech.2"4
Under Justice O'Connor's "simple" application of the Central Hudson test,
this case would be a closer case.2'o Under this "simple" application, Rhode
Island's regulation passed the first three prongs of the Central Hudson test,2'
but failed the last because the ban was not narrowly tailored, that is, the interest
197. Id. at 1506.
198. Commercial speech receives constitutional protection in order to increase the flow of
truthful commercial information. To the extent that a regulation is aimed at the truthfulness of the
speech or legality of the activity advertised, it can be said to be in this same vein. Id. at 1507.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1508.
202. 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1509 (1996) (involving first factor of
the Central Hudson test). See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
203. 44 Liquornart, 116 S. Ct. at 1508. Specifically, it was noted that the regulation did not
significantly advance temperance and that no facts indicated that it would have any effect on market-
wide consumption. Id. This is an augmentation of the second factor of the Central Hudson test.
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
204. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1509-10. The regulation was not a "reasonable fit" as
required by the Central Hudson test. Id. at 1510. Justice Stevens' opinion noted specific examples
of alternative regulations including increased prices by direct regulation, increased taxation, rationing
of purchases, and educational campaigns. Id. at 1510.
205. Id. at 1521.
206. Id. For a review of the prongs of the Central Hudson test, see supra notes 177-80 and
accompanying text.
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did not reasonably fit the regulation."t  Once again, other methods of
regulation would have achieved the government's goal without being so
restrictive of speech.' s
After 44 Liquormart, the law is a bit unclear as to the level of protection
that commercial speech will receive. However, the Court appears prepared to
acknowledge circumstances in which "special care" must be taken to protect
commercial speech. The rationale for discriminating against commercial speech
continues to narrow, and, as Justice Thomas noted, any reasons for disparate
treatment of commercial speech are not so clear, even to the most cognizant
scholars. 209
D. Parody, the First Amendment, and Expressive Commercial Speech
You can do it your own way, if it's done just how I say...
Freedom with their exception.21 °
Courts have recognized parodic expression as a form of protected
speech. 21' Such protection is due chiefly to the nature of parody-parody is
more like expression than just exploitation of another's symbols. V 2 The level
of First Amendment protection that parody is granted remains an open question,
especially where the parody has a commercial quality. In Cliff's Notes, Inc. v.
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc.,213 the Second Circuit
characterized the Supreme Court's decision in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell2"4
as granting wholesale protection to satire even when applied to a product sold
commercially. 25 Parodies and satires deserve protection because their
expressive element requires more protection than commercial product labels.2"6
Although it may disparage its subject, some measure of freedom needs to be
207. 44Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1521. To be a "reasonable fit," the regulation must be in
proportion to the interest served. However, it does not need to be the least restrictive regulation
possible. Id.
208. 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1522 (1996).
209. Id. at 1518. See supra note 194.
210. METALLICA, Eye of the Beholder, on... AND JUSTICE FOR ALL (Electra Records 1988).
211. LONG, supra note 83, at 273.
212. Cliff's Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d
Cir. 1989) (involving parody of Cliff's Notes study guides).
213. 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989).
214. 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (involving parody in the form of a fake advertisement ridiculing public
figure Jerry Falwell).
215. Cliff's Notes, 886 F.2d at 493.
216. Id. at 495. The court here applied the same rationale given for extending protection to
movie titles as granted in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), to the situation of
labeling a booklet by SPY magazine that satirized Cliff's Notes study guides and selected popular
novels.
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carved out for parody because parody tends to be entertaining and critical.2, 7
For instance, parody of a celebrity or political figure makes a vital contribution
to the "marketplace of ideas"" 8 because it exposes weaknesses in ideas and
values. 219 The humorous content of parodic expression should not lessen the
level of protection under the First Amendment;2' indeed, parody need not
even be effectively humorous to merit protection.22" '
Parodists require First Amendment protection from many causes of
action, 22 but most challenges to the parody come under intellectual property
laws.'2 Under copyright law, the fair use doctrine protects some parodies by
avoiding the rigid protection of copyrighted works used by others in an
expressive way.224 Similarly, trademark protection does not constitute an
absolute right to prohibit another's use of one's trademark. Prior to the
enactment of the FTDA, the Lanham Act only prohibited those uses that
217. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987).
218. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (discussing
the value of speech as contributing to the wealth of human knowledge from which the best ideas may
rise).
219. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 972 (10th Cir.
1996) (involving an invasion of rights of publicity claim for baseball cards ridiculing certain high
visibility athletes).
220. Id. at 969.
221. "First Amendment protections do not apply only to those who speak clearly, whose jokes
are funny, and whose parodies succeed." Yankee Publ'g, Inc. v. News America Publ'g, Inc., 809
F. Supp. 267, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). CF. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239,
251 (1903) (recognizing value in circus posters sufficient to justify copyright protection). Consider
the following instruction by the Supreme Court:
[lI]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of [a work], outside of the narrowest and most
obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss
appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had
learned the new language in which their author spoke.
Id.
222. One example is the intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (Rev. Jerry Falwell alleged intentional infliction of
emotional distress for parody portraying him as having drunken sex with his mother in an outhouse).
Another example is the right of publicity. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996) (unauthorized trading cards with caricatures of famous
baseball players).
223. Specifically this implicates the Lanham Act. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994
& Supp. 1 1996). Also, copyright law protects expressive works. 17 U.S.C. 101-810; 1001-10
(1994 & Supp. 1 1996). There are also numerous analogous state laws. See, e.g., supra note 19.
224. "The fair use doctrine thus 'permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed
to foster." Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting Stewart v.
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)). "A parody is entitled at least to conjure up the original." Tin
Pan Apple, Inc. v. MillerBrewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826,830 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (internal quotations
omitted).
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constituted false representations.' Trademark law historically has prohibited
any use of a trademark that would harm the affiliated product's reputation, 2 6
and trademark law can only remedy unauthorized commercial uses of a
trademark that are injurious.2 7 In fact, the Second Circuit has explicitly
recognized a parody defense for trademark infringement.228 The protection
granted to parodies against copyright and trademark infringement actions also
applies to trademark dilution actions. 2 9
However, there are limits to the existing protection granted to parodies, and
those who are the subjects of parodies are not completely without remedies.
The First Amendment does not provide a license to disregard legally recognized
rights in intellectual property." This is because free speech rights are not
absolute, and other legitimate interests must also be considered.2 31 In fact,
many courts consider the protection of parody not as a special defense, but
simply a special case of existing defenses. 32  For instance, in copyright
225. Consumers Union, Inc. v. New Regina Corp., 664 F. Supp. 753, 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
This case, however, was decided prior to the addition of the antidilution statute which arguably does
not require a use which is a false representation. An argument may be made that conceptually
Lanham is to protect only against false representations or those tending to falsity. Therefore,
diluting uses which do not tend to represent falsely should not be prohibited by Lanham. While this
argument may be meritorious, it will not be addressed in this note.
226. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir.
1979) (quoting James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir.
1976)).
227. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 29 (lst Cir. 1987) (citing
Lucasfilm, Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 933-35 (D.D.C. 1985) (finding no property
rights for owner of trademark "Star Wars" against its use by public interest groups to refer to
President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative)).
228. Tin Pan Apple, 737 F. Supp. at 833 (finding a parody in an advertisement to be beyond
the reach of the defense for its infringement of publicity rights).
229. "The ridicule conveyed by parody inevitably conflicts with one of the underlying purposes
of the . . . anti-dilution statute, which is to protect against the tarnishment of the goodwill and
reputation associated with a particular trademark." L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 28. The First Circuit
found the application of an antidilution statute to a noncommercial parody to be offensive to the
Constitution when regulated simply because the use was in an "offensive" or "unwholesome"
context. Id. at 31. But see Pillsbury v. Milky Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(deeming the offensive depiction of plaintiff's trademark in sexually explicit activities an'actionable
dilution).
230. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th
Cir. 1979) (finding trademark infringement by former Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders who exposed
their breasts in a poster while wearing uniforms very similar to those trademarked by the Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders).
231. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1181 (5th
Cir. 1980) (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
232. LONG, supra note 83, at 274.
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infringement actions, parody is considered a special case of the fair use
defense. 2 3  Hence, under copyright law, parodies are not automatically
protected just because they are parodies.2
Similarly, one party's parodic use of another's trademark does not provide
a separate defense to trademark infringement, although it factors into the
likelihood of confusion equation. 5 In L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers,
Inc.,236 the First Circuit drew a line, thus declining to protect parodies which
were commercial and not considered editorial or artistic expression. 37
233. The statute reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of
a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
234. The "[s]uggestion that any parodic use is presumptively fair has no justification in law or
fact.. . ." Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1172 n.14 (1994). In fact, for purposes of
legal analyses, some parodies may not be legally recognized for protection. Tin Pan Apple, Inc.
v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("IThere is ample authority for
the proposition that appropriation of copyrighted material solely for personal profit, unrelieved by
any creative purpose, cannot constitute parody as a matter of law.").
235. Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Pacific Graphics, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1454, 1462
(W.D. Wash. 1991) (recognizing that a parody may be less likely to confuse where the subject
matter concerns social commentary).
236. 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987).
237. Id. at 32. Prior to L.L. Bean, many courts had enjoined commercial trademark parodies.
See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979)
(holding that use of trademark in promotion and content of pornographic film was unauthorized);
Chemical Corp. of Amer. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 965 (1963) (insecticide maker advertising with "Where there's life, there's bugs" parody of
"Where there's life, there's Bud" trademark of Budweiser); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc.
v. Topps Chewing Gum, 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (holding that the marketing of
"Garbage Pail Kids" stickers injured Cabbage Patch Kids trademark); D.C. Comics, Inc. v.
Unlimited Monkey Bus., 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (holding that Superman and Wonder
Woman trademarks were injured by parody characters of singing telegram franchisor); General Elec.
Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1036 (D. Mass. 1979) (holding that "Genital Electric"
monogram on underpants and t-shirts injured plaintiff's trademarked name); Gucci Shops, Inc. v.
R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (enjoining marketing of diaper bags with
"Gucchi Goo" trademark as parody of plaintiffs "Gucci" trademark); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini
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However, the First Circuit drew this line prior to the 44 Liquormart case. 238
The challenge is to find the fulcrum on which to balance the'competing
interests in free expression and intellectual property protection. The First
Amendment only protects trademark parodies that are recognizable as parodies,
because these are less likely to confuse the public.239 Thus, the law may ban
parodies that infringe trademarks and are more likely to deceive consumers than
to inform them.2" Because dilution actions do not require this analysis of
consumer confusion, First Amendment protection cannot be premised within the
dilution considerations. Therefore, parodies that are challenged in dilution
actions raise a different set of considerations, and a survey of some of the
various means of parody protection may be instructive.
In cases involving parodies that may be actionable under a tort liability
theory, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, courts look to the
subject of the parody to draw the balance between interests, as in Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell.24' The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
requires a plaintiff, who is a public figure suing because of a harmful caricature,
to prove actual malice before a court may allow recovery under tort law, even
though the caricature may be repugnant to most viewers.242 The First
Amendment was designed to protect the free flow of ideas, and robust political
debate tends to lead to speech that is critical of public figures.243 An offensive
motive of a parodist is not a proper trigger for liability in the parody of a public
figure. 2' Similarly, where a famous trademark is the subject of an outrageous
and offensive parody, this alone is not sufficient reason to suppress the
expression.245 Famous trademarks, even more so than famous people, are
major symbols of expression and often convey ideas and ideals2" such that
Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding that marketing poster reading "Enjoy
Cocaine," as parody of "Enjoy Coca-Cola," injured senior trademark). Unlike the Eighth Circuit,
the First Circuit in L.L. Bean did not have occasion to decide the issue of marketing the use of a
trademark whose purpose was to convey a message. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 775
F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1985) (granting an injunction against "Mutant of Omaha" t-shirts to protest
nuclear weapons).
238. See supra notes 181-209 and accompanying text.
239. To be protected from trademark infringement actions, a parody must "allow an ordinarily
prudent consumer to appreciate the point of the parody, thereby diminishing the risk of confusion."
Black Dog Tavern Co. v. Hall, 823 F. Supp. 48, 57 (D. Mass. 1993).
240. Consumers Union, Inc. v. New Regina Corp., 664 F. Supp. 753, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
241. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
242. Id. at 52.
243. Id. at 52-53.
244. "[Mlany things done with motives that are less than admirable are protected by the First
Amendment." Id. at 53.
245. Id. at 55 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978)).
246. See infra notes 392-96 and accompanying text.
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parodies of these symbols deserve protection as much as those regarding public
figures!'4 7
The fair use defense provides a zone of safety for a valued expressive
parody in copyright infringement land.248 Under copyright infringement's fair
use analysis, a parody's commercial character does not bar protection, but is
only a consideration in determining the fairness of the use. 249 While the
commercial nature of a parody militates against a fair use defense, it is not
determinative."
In Rogers v. Grimaldi,"5' the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
struck a balance of the public interest in free expression and the public interest
against confusion in a trademark infringement action. The court concluded that,
the Lanham Act, as of 1989, should only prohibit artistic"5 uses where the
likelihood of confusion outweighed the interest in expression.253 The court in
Cliff's Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc.2 54 applied
the Rogers holding to a parody of study guides and suggested that all parodies
are artistic expressions 55 and that, for the sake of free expression, slight risks
of confusion must be tolerated. 56 The Tenth Circuit applied this balancing
test in a 1996 case where a parody implicated the right of publicity.25 7 The
court there considered the competing interests of the tort of the right of publicity
and the First Amendment interests in free expression. 258
247. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that
diminishing the protection afforded parody solely because a parodist chose a famous tradename,
rather than a famous personality, as its target would be an anomaly).
248. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579(1994)
(characterizing § 107 as "breathing space" within copyright).
249. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584.
250. Id. at 585. Compare Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 832
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that parody, as a protected class of speech, would be improperly expanded
if made to include commercial parodies entirely for profit), with Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.
507, 510 (1948) ("The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the
protection of that basic right").
251. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
252. Assigning a marketable title to a film and advertising the film under said title was deemed
artistic. Id. at 997.
253. Cliff's Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d
Cir. 1989) (citing Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998-99).
254. 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989).
255. "Thus, we hold that the Rogers balancing approach is generally applicable to Lanham Act
claims against works of artistic expression, a category that includes parody." Id. at 495.
256. Id.
257. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959,974-76 (10th Cir.
1996).
258. Id. at 976.
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Thus, numerous areas of the law protect parodies, although with certain
limitations. Trademark law protected the trademark against some unauthorized
uses, particularly those in the commercial context. However, the law should not
deny protection to expressive uses of trademarks in parodies simply because they
have a commercial nature; after all, the First Amendment protects commercial
speech as well as expressions which may be contained therein. Furthermore,
courts have traditionally granted First Amendment protection to parodic
expression where the unique expressive character outweighs competing legal
interests.
III. ANALYSIS OF A COMMERCIAL TRADEMARK
PARODY UNDER THE LANHAM ACT
ITihere's too much confusion, I can't get no relief. 9
To properly analyze the legal treatment of a commercial trademark parody,
such as the Hangunder hypothetical, under the FTDA, it is important to begin
by noting that such use of the senior trademark would not likely confuse the
public. As such, the use would not be actionable under federal trademark
infringement and unfair competition statutes.2W6 However, the FTDA would
protect the trademark against a parody that causes dilution. 6 1  The problem
arises when the FTDA would not protect a commercial trademark parody even
though the First Amendment would."62
A. Likelihood of Confusion: Infringement, Unfair Competition, and the
Commercial Parody
In order to maintain an action for trademark infringement or unfair
competition under the Lanham Act, the plaintiff must establish that the
defendant's use of the plaintiff's trademark is likely to cause confusion in the
consuming public as to the source of the good.163 Case law under the Lanham
Act's infringement statute has parsed the likelihood of confusion standard into
an eight part multi-factor test, as articulated in Polaroid, Inc. v. Polarad
Electronics Corp., Inc.2" To better understand this concept, and how courts
259. BOB DYLAN, All Along the Watchtower, on JOHN WESLEY HARDING (Columbia 1967).
260. See infra notes 263-319 and accompanying text.
261. See infra notes 320-50 and accompanying text.
262. See infra notes 351-96 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
264. 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
Where the products are different, the prior owner's chance of success is a function of
many variables: [1] the strength of his trademark, [2] the degree of similarity between
the two trademarks, [3] the proximity of the products, [4] the likelihood that the prior
owner will bridge the gap, [5] actual confusion, and [6] the reciprocal of defendant's
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decide whether a trademark parody2" is likely to confuse, a factor-by-factor
analysis of trademark parody and the Hangunder hypothetical under the Polaroid
factors is useful. The following analysis of the likelihood of confusion factors
will show that Hangunder's use is not likely to confuse; thus, to maintain an
action under federal trademark law, Anheuser-Busch would have to pursue an
action under the FTDA.
The first factor is the strength of the plaintiffs trademark. 2" The
strength factor, as applied to trademarks, involves the tendency of the trademark
to identify the goods sold under the trademark as goods issued from a particular,
though possibly anonymous, source.267  In other words, the trademark need
not indicate from which identifiable source the goods came, but that a particular
source issued the goods. There are four categories of trademarks ranging, in
ascending strength, from the generic,2" to the descriptive, 26  the
suggestive, 270  and finally to the arbitrary or fanciful. 2 1  Each category
speaks to the relationship between the trademark and the good. A purchaser
might think that a generic or descriptive trademark simply describes the product,
whereas a purchaser is more likely to readily identify the source of the good
when an arbitrary trademark is used. Thus, when a "stronger" mark is
parodied, the public is more likely to find the use confusing.
The strength factor weighs heavily against parodists. Trademark parodies
often use strong trademarks as their targets.'m Returning to the hypothetical,
Hangunder has selected a very strong trademark to parody. Because of years
of extensive advertising and market domination, Budweiser has gained a large
good faith in adopting its own mark, [7] the quality of defendant's product, and [8] the
sophistication of the buyers. Even this extensive catalogue does not exhaust the
possibilities-the court may have to take still other variables into account.
Id. at 495.
265. While trademark infringement and unfair competition actions are not by any means limited
to parodic uses, for purposes of this note, the text will focus on this small class of uses.
266. Polaroid Corp., 287 F.2d at 495.
267. McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1979).
268. The trademark "soap" for a bar of soap is an example of a generic trademark. Such a
term cannot be recognized legally as a trademark. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT,
TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES-CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 223 (3d ed. 1993).
269. The term "100% Pure Soap" is descriptive and may be legally recognized as a trademark
only if it acquires secondary meaning-the ability to identify the single source of the good. Id.
270. "Ivory Soap" is a suggestive term in that it only suggests a character or ingredient of the
good, and the public is left to its imagination to determine the nature of the goods. Id.
271. "Camay Soap" is an example of an arbitrary or fanciful term, because "Camay" is a term
far removed from a mere description of the good it identifies. Id.
272. Steven M. Perez, Confronting Biased Treatment of Trademark Parody Under the Lanham
Act, 44 EMORY L.J.,1451, 1489 (1995).
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identification value and great distinctiveness. Additionally, the word
"Budweiser" does not describe or suggest anything about the beer and seems
arbitrary or fanciful. Thus, because Hangunder has parodied a strong
trademark, this factor weighs against Hangunder. 2 3
The second factor in the likelihood of confusion analysis is the similarity
of the trademarks.274 While important to the analysis, close physical similarity
of trademarks is not conclusive.275 For instance, when considering trademarks
that were formed by letters and words, courts have historically considered
differences in spelling.276 However, courts now predominately analyze the
impression on the purchasing public.2" Thus, courts consider whether the
public is likely to think that the goods of one manufacturer actually came from
another source due to the similarity of the marks. If a court determines that a
similar mark is likely to confuse the public, this factor will weigh in favor of the
use being an infringment or unfair competition.
In a lawsuit against a trademark parody, this factor favors the defendant.
A parody must make its viewer realize what it is poking fun at. For a parody
to conjure the image of the subject mark in the viewer's mind, it will have to
bear substantial similarity to it.278 A parody, however, typically differs from
the original in such ridiculous ways that the consumer may not be likely to
believe that the trademark owner is the source of the parody.279 The
Sudmeister labels in Hangunder's advertisement are very similar in color and
design to that of Budweiser, although a different name appears. The frogs are
similar to those in the Budweiser advertisements, although they do appear in a
grotesque state. Although the marks are similar in their appearance, their
differences may mitigate the likelihood that the average consumer would confuse
the source of the advertisement with Anheuser-Busch. 2" However, due to the
similarities of the cans, labels, and frogs, this factor, focusing merely on the
physical similarity of the marks, might weigh slightly in favor of the plaintiff,
Anheuser-Busch.
273. Id. (stating that strong marks receive more protection than weaker marks under the
Polaroid factors).
274. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
275. McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1133 (2d Cir. 1979).
276. Pikle-Rite Co. v. Chicago Pickle Co., 171 F. Supp. 671, 675 (N.D. I11. 1959). While
Sudmeister uses seven of nine letters of Budweiser, this factor is somewhat antiquated and may not
weigh so heavily.
277. Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1988).
278. Robert J. Shaughnessy, Note, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First Amendment
Analysis, 72 VA. L. REv. 1079, 1093 (1986).
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1092-93 (providing a similar analysis of Girl Scouts v. Personality Posters Mfg.
Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)).
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The third factor is the proximity of the products,28' which involves the
similarity of the products and markets to which the senior and junior uses are
applied. 2' Although courts will consider the geographic proximity of the
product markets, mere physical distance is not decisive regarding the proximity
factor.8 3 Rather, as a general rule, the more decisive inquiry is whether the
products compete with one another. 2
In Tetley, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. ,2 the Eastern District Court
of New York considered the proximity of two products: stickers in a pack of
gum and the label on a tea bag. The court, noting arguably insignificant
differences, distinguished the parody from the original. The court noted that the
teabag label was on the outside of the packages, while the parody stickers were
within gum packs, even though the plaintiff's commercial packaging included a
picture remarkably similar to the defendant's stickers. 286 The court also found
important the fact that the bubble gum was marketed primarily to children in
candy stores rather than adults in grocery stores.
28
Also, in considering the proximity factor, the court in Cliff's Notes, Inc. v..
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc. 21 focused on the medium of
sales of the products, the manner of sales, and the audiences to which the
product was aimed. The court deemed the pamphlets mocking Cliff's Notes
study guides289 to be sold in the same medium and manner as the targeted
study guides because both were books sold in the same section of a
bookstore.2 ' However, the court noted that the audiences were distinct in that
the "Spy Notes" books were not likely to confuse consumers purchasing Cliff's
Notes. Thus, upon closer consideration, the products were not so close in
proximity.
281. Polaroid Corp., 287 F.2d at 495.
282. Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 874 (2d Cir. 1986).
283. Diner, Inc. v. Dream Kitchen, Inc., 1995 WL 438627, at *5 (1995).
284. Lang v. Retirement Living Publ'g Co., 949 F.2d 576, 582 (2d Cir. 1991).
285. 556 F. Supp. 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
286. Id. at 790.
287. Id. at 790-91.
288. 718 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), vacated Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday
Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989).
289. The Spy Notes parody pamphlets copied prominent features of Cliff's Notes study guides
including: listing, on the cover, the novel which is discussed in the book, and the distinctive black
and yellow stripes and black typeface of the Cliff s Notes covers were copied for the Spy Notes
covers. Cliff's Notes, 718 F. Supp. at 1161. However, Spy Notes covers clearly labeled the books
as a satire and used a black silhouette of a clay sculpture of New York City, rather than the black
silhouette of a mountain found on Cliff's Notes covers. Clifs Notes, 886 F.2d at 492. Spy Notes
also had red, white, and blue on its cover, which Cliff's Notes did not. Id.
290. Cliffs Notes, 718 F. Supp. at 1165-66.
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In the Hangunder hypothetical, the proximity of products factor would
likely weigh in Hangunder's favor. In light of Tetley, a court might give
substantial weight to the fact that Hangunder markets its headache relief in drug
stores, whereas Budweiser is marketed with liquor. Even though both are
commercially packaged as noted in Cliff's Notes and both are marketed to adults
as noted in Tetley, Inc., the distinctly different nature of the two products will
likely weigh against proximity.
The fourth factor in the likelihood of confusion test is the likelihood that the
senior user of the trademark will bridge the gap between the products,2 9 1 that
is, whether the senior trademark owner is likely to begin marketing products
with its mark in the same market as the junior user's goods. Whether the senior
user is likely to enter the same market as the junior user is significant because
such an entry would make the junior use more likely to confuse g. 2 ' This
factor essentially looks at whether the purchaser of the junior user's good would
think that the senior user might try marketing that kind of product.
Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R. H. Macy & Co. 293 was one of the few cases in
which a court found a parodic use on a good to occur within the scope of
products that the senior user would likely consider marketing. Gucci involved
a parody of the senior user's "Gucci" mark when the defendant placed a
"Gucchi Goo" mark on diaper bags. 2 ' The court noted that diaper bags are
very similar to the many handbags and totes sold by Gucci, a producer known
for its high priced fashion accessories, and that the public could conclude that
the diaper bags were within an expanded line of Gucci products. 29,
In the Hangunder hypothetical, it is unlikely that Anheuser-Busch would
expand into pharmaceuticals. First, marketing hangover relief would undermine
beer marketing, which advertises the pleasures of alcohol. Additionally, because
an alcohol distributor entering the highly competitive arena of drug
manufacturing would encounter high costs and uncertainty, Anheuser-Busch
would probably be inclined not to bridge the gap between products.
291. Polaroid Corp., 287 F.2d at 495.
292. Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imports Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167, 1174 (2d Cir. 1976)
(enjoining defendant's use of trademark "VERA" on perfumes).
293. 446 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting injunction against use of "Gucchi Goo" mark
on diaper bags infringing "Gucci" trademark for handbags).
294. Id. at 839.
295. Id. at 839-40.
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The fifth Polaroid, Inc. factor is actual confusion to the consumer
public.29  While the plaintiff is not required to prove actual confusion to
establish a likelihood of confusion, the presence of actual confusion would
help."9  Thus, the plaintiff may offer proof, empirical or otherwise, that
purchasers were actually confused as to the source of the defendant's goods.
However, the actual confusion factor is also not dispositive.298
In Girl Scouts of the United States v. Personality Posters Manufacturing
Co.,299 the court noted that people who had seen the poster depicting a
pregnant girl in full scout regalia with the words "be prepared" were not
confused as to the source of the poster. Rather, viewers actually contacted the
Girl Scouts to warn them of such abuse.' °0 Such a situation, where people are
not confused, but actually recognize the parodic nature of the use, will be the
case with most parodies because parodies tend to criticize or disparage their
subject. 0 ' Nevertheless, this factor depends on the nature of the audience.
In this Note, it is assumed that no one confuses Hangunder's use of hungover
frogs with Budweiser.
Sixth, the intent of the defendant is a factor in determining the likelihood
of confusion.' This factor considers the defendant's good or bad faith, and
a court will look closely at the order of events in considering whether the
defendant intended to exploit the plaintiffs goodwill.' The court may
consider the sequence of activities of the defendant and plaintiff. Additionally,
it may consider the specific knowledge of the defendant.'
Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Productions, Inc.3w illustrates most clearly
why parodies often do not show a bad faith intent by the defendant. While
Milky Way intentionally singled out Pillsbury's dough-boy mark for its lewd
296. Polaroid Corp., 287 F.2d at 495.
297. Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding a likelihood
of confusion for use of "GUNG HO" trademark on line of action figures similar to those on which
plaintiff used the trademark).
298. W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 661-62 (2d Cir. 1970) (stating that actual
confusion is not necessary to show likelihood of confusion). Cf. Hasbro, Inc., 858 F.2d at 78
(stating that lack of actual confusion may be used against the plaintiff).
299. 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
300. Shaughnessy, supra note 278, at 1093.
301. Id.
302. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
303. Bear U.S.A., Inc. v. A.J. Sheepskin & Leather Outerwear, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 896, 906
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
304. Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that
actual and constructive notice of another's prior registration of the Mushroom trademark on women's
shoes was relevant, though not necessary to bad faith).
305. 215 U.S.P.Q. 124 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
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sexual parody, it did not have a bad faith intent.' This is chiefly because
this factor does not consider intent to disparage, but intent to confuse.'
While a good parody mimics the original, the parody is designed to differ in
meaningful ways.' Thus, most parodists will lack a bad faith intent to
confuse.
While Hangunder has certainly tried to evoke the Budweiser image in its
advertising, Pillsbury illustrates that this kind of intent is irrelevant. Although
Hangunder knows what Budweiser is and to whom it is marketed, nothing
indicates any intent to confuse the purchasing public. This factor, too, weighs
in favor of Hangunder.
The seventh factor is the quality of the defendant's product. 30 A greater
likelihood of confusion may exist if the defendant's product is inferior to that of
the plaintiff and if consumers are likely to think that the plaintiff issued the
inferior product. 31°  Thus, if a defendant applies a parody of the plaintiff's
trademark to poor products, where it is usually applied to "superior" products,
confusion will be more likely.
Courts have often lumped this factor in with other product considerations
such as proximity of the products or similarity of the goods. 31" A commercial
parody may be associated with any type of product, good, or expression, and
depends mostly on the parodist. It is assumed that Hangunder is a high quality
pain reliever,312 and this factor weighs in favor of Hangunder.
The final Polaroid factor is the sophistication of buyers.31 3 In measuring
susceptibility to confusion under this factor, courts look directly at those who
would be confused (the ordinary purchaser) under normal market conditions.3 14
306. Id. at 134.
307. See id. at 133-34.
308. See supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text.
309. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
310. Nikon Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 987 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1993).
311. See, e.g., McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1134 (2d Cir. 1979)
(associating quality and proximity of goods); Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 77
(2d Cir. 1988) (considering all Polaroid factors but strength of the mark).
312. See supra note 2.
313. Polaroid Corp., 287 F.2d at 495.
314. McGregor-Doniger, Inc., 599 F.2d at 1137.
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The greater the value of a good, the more careful the typical consumer is
expected to be. 315 Courts will also consider the degree of consumer reliance
on the trademarks to identify the source of different goods.
31 6
The sophistication of buyers depends on the goods being marketed.
Because strong marks that have powerful distinctiveness are often the subjects
of parodies, those marks will have a strong identification quotient with the
purchasing public who will be very familiar with the marks. 3 17  Thus,
consumers will rely heavily on these marks. In the Hangunder hypothetical, the
court would analyze pain relievers because they are the goods with which
Hangunder has associated its parody. Consumers do not frequently purchase
pain relievers, which are also, generally, not a high priced commodity.
Additionally, the mark "used," or parodied is Budweiser's, and is a strong
mark. Under this factor then, the likelihood of confusion is higher because
purchasers are more susceptible to confusion when the goods are inexpensive
and bear a strong mark. However, courts often eschew this factor of the test
in their consideration.318
Under the present state of trademark infringement and unfair competition
law, Anheuser-Busch would have little or no protection against the Hangunder
use, primarily because Hangunder's advertisement is not likely to confuse.
While the mark's strength, the similarity of the marks, and purchaser
sophistication weigh in the plaintiff's favor, the remaining factors-proximity of
the markets, the plaintiff's likelihood to bridge the gap, actual confusion, the
defendant's bad intent, and the quality of the defendant's products-all favor the
defendant. For this reason, any federal trademark protection for Anheuser-
Busch would likely have to come from the FTDA.31 9
B. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act
The FTDA320 protects trademark owners against unauthorized commercial
uses of their marks that may reduce the distinctiveness of their marks.32'
Congress proffered two purposes for the Act. First, the FTDA would provide
uniform remedies to trademark owners and nationwide protection in this era of
315. Id.
316. Id. (citing Modular Cinemas, Inc. v. Mini Cinemas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 578, 583
(S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
317. See supra notes 266-71 and accompanying text.
318. See, e.g., Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Pacific Graphics, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1454,
1460-61 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (listing factors to consider in the Ninth Circuit and not including
sophistication of the buyers).
319. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. 1 1996).
320. See supra note 22.
321. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
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widespread trademark use.322  Second, the statute would comply with
international intellectual property agreements into which the United States has
entered.323
The statute provides for injunctions against unauthorized commercial uses
of famous marks3 in commerce, if such uses cause dilution of the distinctive
quality of the marks. 3' While an injunction is the only relief generally
available, willful dilution will give rise to further remedies that are within a
court's discretion and comport with principles of equity.326 The statute
explicitly provides immunity for defendants whose trademarks, which allegedly
dilute the marks of plaintiffs, are registered with the Patent and Trademark
Office. 3"' Finally, and most pertinent to this Note, the statute provides
exceptions for certain uses by defendants: fair uses in comparative
advertising, 32 noncommercial uses, 329 or uses in news reporting and news
commentary. 330 These exceptions are most pertinent because they purportedly
322. Id. The statute provides more uniformity in light of the facts that state antidilution statutes
may differ from each other and that half of the states do not provide for protection against trademark
dilution. Id. at 3-4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030-31. Congress seems to presume
that the "famous marks" protected are ones tending to have nationwide use, thus, demanding
nationwide protection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. 1 1996).
323. The most notable of these agreements with which the statute most directly complies is the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Including Trade in Counterfeit
Goods ("TRIPS"). This agreement was part of the Uruguay Round of the GATT agreement and
included an antidilution provision. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029, 1031.
324. This protection beyond only registered federal trademarks is an effort by Congress to have
the United States set the standard for global protection of intellectual property. Id. at 4, reprinted
in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act provides considerations
for determining whether a mark is famous. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H) (Supp. 1 1996).
325. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
326. See id. § 1125(c)(2).
327. See id. § 1125(c)(3).
328. "Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative commercial advertising or
promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the owner of the famous mark." Id. §
1125(c)(4)(A). See supra note 31.
329. "Noncommercial use of a mark." Id. § 1125(c)(4)(B). The determination of whether a
use is noncommercial is to be made according to the existing case law determinants of commercial
speech. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031. For
a discussion of commercial speech, see supra notes 152-209 and accompanying text.
330. "All forms of news reporting and news commentary." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(C). This
provision was added in consideration of heightened First Amendment protection of the news
industry. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031. See, e.g.,
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1977) (acknowledging First
Amendment protection extended to the press).
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address all First Amendment concerns.33' Most specifically, Congress
suggests that the statute does not threaten noncommercial expressions such as
parody and satire that are not a part of a commercial transaction, ignoring those
that are.332
As of the date of publication, only one reported case of a trademark parody
has involved the exceptions under section 1125(c)(4). In Dr. Seuss Enterprises,
L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.,"' the estate of children's author Dr.
Seuss33" brought suit against the defendant's book. about the infamous double-
murder trial of O.J. Simpson, a book written as a parody of the distinct style of
Dr. Seuss books.335 Because the Dr. Seuss Enterprises court held that
marketing, selling, and advertising a literary parody is noncommercial and, thus,
exempt from application of the FTDA, the case did little to analyze any First
Amendment claims under the Act.336
While the FTDA explains what marks are covered by the statute and what
trademark uses by a second party are exempt, it does little to inform potential
litigants as to the nature of a dilution claim. Instead, litigants must seek
guidance from established state antidilution statutes. The following Section
analyzes the Hangunder advertisement under the FTDA.
331. "The proposal adequately addresses legitimate First Amendment concerns." H.R. REP.
NO. 104-374, at 4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031. See also 141 CONG. REC.
H14,318 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorehead); 141 CONG. REC. S19,310 (daily
ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
332. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031. Seealso 141
CONG. REC. H14,318 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorehead); 141 CONG. REC.
S19,310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
333. 924 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Cal. 1996), aff'd 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
334. Theodore Geisel, a/k/a Dr. Seuss, has written numerous children's books. See, e.g.. DR.
SEUSS, How THE GRINCH STOLE CHRISTMAS (1985); DR. SEUSS, THE LORAX (1971); DR. SEUSS,
HOP ON POP (1963); DR. SEUSS, GREEN EGGS AND HAM (1960); DR. SEUSS, HORTON HATCHES
THE EGG (1940).
335. Dr. Seuss, 924 F. Supp. at 1561. Trademark dilution was only one of several actions that
the plaintiff brought against the book attributed to Dr. Juice (making allusion to O.J. Simpson's
nickname). Id.
336. Id. at 1574. This expressive, noncommercial use, fit the FTDA exception for
noncommercial uses. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B) (Supp. 1 1996).
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C. A Dilution Cause of Action
To maintain a dilution cause of action,337 a plaintiff generally must
establish two factors.338 First, the plaintiff's mark must have a distinctive
quality or have acquired secondary meaning.339  Often, this factor is
established by reviewing the strength of the plaintiff's trademark.' In some
courts, the statutes protecting "famous marks" 3" are limited to the protection
of only extremely strong trademarks .342
Second, the plaintiff must present evidence of a likelihood of dilution, an
admittedly ambiguous factor.4 3  For instance, courts presently have little
guidance in assessing whether a use tarnishes a trademark.' However, the
other forms of dilution actions may provide some help. As an example, to
establish dilution by inferior association, for instance, a court may compare the
value and quality of the plaintiffs and defendant's products. 4 5
337. Obviously, the prima facie dilution case may vary depending on its statutory basis, but a
review of reported cases and statutes indicates that the following requirements predominate.
338. The Sally Gee, Inc. court alluded to a possible third factor of predatory intent. Sally Gee,
Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 626 (2d Cir. 1983). However, the Deere & Co. court,
recognizing the lack of clarity as to the role of predatory intent, declared it to be merely a relevant
consideration to dilution. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 46 (2d Cir. 1994).
Furthermore, predatory intent is considered with the prima facie element of likelihood of dilution.
See infra notes 351-360 and accompanying text.
339. Sally Gee, Inc., 699 F.2d at 625; American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Lab. Corp.,
1989 WL 39679, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 42. A distinctive mark is one
which is arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive enough to identify the source of the goods on which it is
used. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETrMION § 11:2 (2d ed. 1984).
Secondary meaning is where, by use, a mental association in buyers' minds is made between the
alleged mark and the single source of the products to which it is attached. Id. § 15:2. See also
supra notes 268-271.
340. For a definition and review of the concept of trademark strength, see supra notes 266-71
and accompanying text.
341. This nomenclature is used in the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)
(Supp. 11996).
342. The Sally Gee, Inc. court, applying the New York dilution statute, refers to protection of
.celebrated and famous" trademarks. Sally Gee, Inc. 699 F.2d at 625. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§ 368-d (McKinney 1996).
343. Likelihood of dilution was characterized as "a somewhat nebulous concept." Sally Gee,
Inc., 699 F.2d at 625.
344. Many difficult considerations arise when making a finding that the defendant's use
.evoke[s] unflattering thoughts" or places the plaintiffs trademark in an "unwholesome context."
Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994).
345. See, e.g., Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625-26 (2d Cir. 1983)
(holding no dilution by inferior association because goods to which junior use was applied were of
better quality than goods associated with senior use). See also Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 44-46
(holding a review of likelihood of dilution beyond the traditional branches of blurring and loss of
reputation).
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On the other hand, blurring requires evidence that the plaintiff's trademark
has a product-evoking quality' that would be weakened should the
defendant's use of the trademark persist. 7 A concurring opinion in a Second
Circuit case, Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,"S
formulated a test for blurring, and that court seemingly adopted that test in
Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc. 9 Under this test, courts consider six
factors to determine a finding of blurring: (1) the similarity of the plaintiff's
and defendant's trademarks; (2) the similarity of the plaintiff's and defendant's
products; (3) the sophistication of the consumers; (4) any predatory intent on the
part of the defendant; (5) the renown of the senior trademark; and (6) the
renown of the junior trademark. 35  In the next Section, these various
formulations are applied to the Hangunder hypothetical.
D. Protection Granted to a Commercial Trademark Parody Under the FTDA
While hungover frogs are in poor taste, the Hangunder advertisement does
not create an unwholesome association35" ' for Anheuser-Busch trademarks, and
a case such as Jordache Enterprises, Inc. would likely serve as precedent for a
ruling that Anheuser-Busch's trademarks were not tarnished.352 Likewise, a
claim of dilution by inferior association would likely fail because Hangunder,
as this hypothetical assumes, is a high quality, effective hangover reliever.353
As in the case of Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc. ," association with a
product will not diminish the business reputation by an inferior association when
the product is not inferior to that associated with the senior trademark.355
346. The distinctiveness or acquired secondary meaning of the trademark would likely establish
this, though case law is somewhat ambiguous on this point. See, e.g., Sally Gee, Inc. 699 F.2d at
625.
347. Id. at 625.
348. 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989).
349. 41 F.3d 39, 43 n.8 (2d Cir. 1994).
350. MeadData, 875 F.2d at 1035.
351. Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48, 57 (D.N.M. 1985).
352. Using the trademark in a way that is in poor taste, but not particularly unwholesome,
unsavory, or degrading, is not tarnishment. Id. Note, however, that a court following Deere & Co.
might find dilution based on the alteration of Budweiser's trademarks, aside from the traditional
analyses. Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 45. Hangunder is close to fitting such a definition of dilution
as the Deere & Co. court proposed: alterations of a trademark by a competitor with incentive to
diminish the favorable attributes of the trademark and ample opportunity to promote its product in
ways that make no significant alteration of the plaintiff's trademark may constitute dilution. Id.
While Hangunder is proposing a sale of its own product and is altering Anheuser-Busch's
trademarks, it is not a competitor for beer, neither does it have any pecuniary incentive to diminish
the favorable attributes of Budweiser's trademark. Thus, the alteration of Anheuser-Busch's
trademark does not constitute dilution by tamishment.
353. See supra note 2.
354. 699 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1983).
355. Id. at 625. See supra notes 109-22 and accompanying text.
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As to blurring, a court would likely hold that, under the Mead Data
35 6
factors, Hangunder's use dilutes Anheuser-Busch's trademarks. While the
trademarks are very similar in pronunciation, design, and nature, they are not
similar in the strictest sense. Beer and pain relievers do not directly compete.
However, the concept of product similarity is arguably broader than the narrow
construction of direct competition, as direct competition is not required for a
dilution claim.357 Because hangover relief is certainly related to alcohol sales,
a court might find some similarities. The sophistication of consumers is
probably low, tending toward a finding of dilution by blurring.35 Without
augmenting the hypothetical to establish any subjective predatory intent, some
such intent could be inferred from Hangunder's specific targeting of a major
advertiser in the alcohol industry. Likewise, the final two elements35 9 tend
toward a finding of dilution in that Budweiser is a renowned trademark, while
Hangunder is a fledgling product with a fledgling trademark. Budweiser has a
primafacie claim for dilution, and Hangunder's advertisement fails to meet any
of the exceptions provided by the federal statute.' However, First
Amendment principles regarding commercial speech and parodies would seem
to indicate that this advertisement should be protected.
E. First Amendment Protection for a Commercial Parody
Assuming that the 44 Liquormart "special care" analysis represents the
trend in the constitutional protection of commercial speech, its analysis would
apply to any injunction enjoining the Hangunder advertisement under the FTDA.
While the sale and advertising of headache relievers is presumably legal, the
question whether the advertisement is false requires further analysis.
By its very nature, parody involves some degree of fiction and, thus, in and
of itself, parody is designed to be an exaggerated falsity in an attempt to show
the truth by criticizing its target." In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,2
356. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d
Cir. 1989). See supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
357. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1994); Sally Gee, Inc., 699
F.2d at 624.
358. Analysis of this factor follows the analysis of the Polaroid trademark infringement factor
bearing the same name. See supra notes 313-18 and accompanying text.
359. These final two elements are the renown of the senior trademark and the renown of the
junior trademark. See supra note 350 and accompanying text.
360. Hangunder's advertisement is not a comparative advertisement because it does not identify
competing goods because a hangover relief does not compete with beer in the marketplace. It also
is not news reporting or news commentary, and it is commercial. See supra notes 152-209 and
accompanying text.
361. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579-80 (1994).
362. 497 U.S. I (1990) (reviewing a claim for defamation regarding statements at disciplinary
hearings about a wrestling coach's conduct).
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the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment requires plaintiffs to bear the
burden of showing falsity, where falsity is material.' The Court specifically
noted this doctrine's applicability to parody3" and rhetorical hyperbole.'
Thus, opinions-i.e., statements which do not imply an objective fact-are not
false.' Because Hangunder's parodic characterization of Budweiser as
intoxicating frogs is probably not objectively provable (although, admittedly,
tests could analyze the effects of alcohol on amphibians), the portrayal of frogs
as animals that imbibe and celebrate like "party humans" would almost certainly
qualify as rhetorical hyperbole.
Because Hangunder's advertisement would not be illegal or false, the
government 7 must have a substantial interest for an injunction to issue against
the advertisement.' The plethora of dilution statutes and the long-standing
and increasingly popular recognition of intellectual property rights suggest that
states have a substantial interest in protection against trademark dilution.3 69
However, under the "special care" analysis, the restriction still must
advance the government interest to a material degree.37 Enjoining parodies
does not so advance a state interest. The state interest arises when the use of
a trademark diminishes its distinctiveness.37 The Hangunder parody does not
implicate this interest because parodies rarely weaken the ability of targeted
363. This standard may insulate from liability some speech which is false but unprovable. Id.
at 16. While defamation is a tort requiring falsity, which dilution does not, the analysis should be
the same because falsity is an element of the constitutional inquiry for the restriction of commercial
speech. "To create liability for defamation there must be: (a) a false and defamatory statement
concerning another. .. ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977) (emphasis added).
364. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (involving an alcohol advertisement
parody depicting televangelist as having his first encounter with alcohol and sex with his mother in
an outhouse).
365. See, e.g., Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974) (finding that the use of the word
"traitor" in literary definition of a union "scab" was merely rhetorical hyperbole and not actionable
as defamation).
366. Expression of "opinion" may often imply an assertion of objective fact. Milkovich, 497
U.S. at 18. Only assertions of objectively provable falsity are actionable. Id. at 18-21.
367. AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941) (finding state action when state court enforces a claim
by an individual under the laws of the state, which resulted in the restraining of peaceful picketing).
368. Some argue that injunctions should be treated as a prior restraint of speech. See, e.g.,
Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REv. 11
(1981).
369. This is required under the 44 Liquornart "special care" analysis and the Central Hudson
test. See supra notes 176-80, 201-04 and accompanying text.
370. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 110 S. Ct. 1495, 1499 (1996). See also supra notes
190-204 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 79-97 and accompanying text.
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marks to identify their owners.3" Additionally, trademark parodies do not
discourage investment in trademarks which, although a substantial state interest,
would not be materially advanced by enjoining parodies. 3' Central to any
inquiry is the fact that the Sudmeister logo and Hangunder frogs are not applied
to Hangunder pills, but to an imaginary product within the advertisement.3 74
Not only does the Hangunder advertisement merit protection as commercial
speech, but the parody's expressive nature also mandates protection.
In order to determine whether the advertisement deserves protection, a
balancing of expression and trademark interests is also important. The public
has an interest in avoiding trademark dilution. Trademarks are valuable
commodities insofar as they identify the sources of goods. To the degree this
effect is hindered, the public is harmed.375 While Hangunder used Anheuser-
Busch's trademarks in a commercial promotion of its own product, the use did
not name Budweiser as the mark of Hangunder relief. The very hypothetical
that was used to justify dilution statutes from their inception in 1927 and their
federal counterpart in 1995-the use of the name Kodak on
pianos376 -demonstrates that the use of a mark to identify the source of a
product is central to dilution actions. Because Hangunder's use does not dilute
the Anheuser-Busch trademarks in this way, the dilution interest implicated is
less than maximal.
Moreover, the First Amendment interests are significant. As a parody, the
use of the Sudmeister symbols and the drunken frogs comments on the values
expressed in Budweiser advertisements. Hangunder's commercial trademark
parody is distinguishable from the t-shirt sales in Mutual of Omaha Insurance
Co. v. Novak.3' In Mutual of Omaha, the Eighth Circuit deemed that a
commercial parody of Mutual of Omaha's trademark Indian head to comment
on toxic waste did not have sufficient First Amendment justification, because the
372. "Trademark parodies do little to weaken a mark's capacity to call to mind its owner's
products; indeed, the parodist's very purpose in using the products is to conjure up the images
ordinarily associated with it so that he may comment on them." Shaughnessy, supra note 278, at
1113.
373. "[Ulauthorized use of a [trade]mark merely to refer to the trademark owner or its products
does little to discourage investment in trademarks." Id. at 1105.
374. The advertisement is not a comparative advertisement because the headache reliever and
beer are not competing products. "Fair use . . . in comparative commercial advertising . . . to
identify the competing goods ... " 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A) (Supp. 1 1996) (emphasis added).
See supra note 31.
375. See supra note 136.
376. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030; 141
CONG. REC. H14,317 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorehead); 141 CONG. REC.
S19,310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
377. 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987).
Pearson: Commercial Trademark Parody, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act,
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1998
1020 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32
use was a satire, not a parody.373 The difference is subtle but important.
Courts have recognized that intellectual property rights must be curtailed to the
point that a parodist may conjure up the associations generated by the subject of
the parody in order to comment on them. 379  Additionally, courts have
recognized that parodies are more expressive than the mere labels on products
(i.e., the KODAK" use).38 '
Parody deserves freedom as entertainment and criticism, 3 ' even if its
target is a trademark. Regulating expressions merely because they involve the
use of trademarks empowers those with the ability to stop such uses to become
monitors of the spoken and written english language. 3 3 It is not fair to protect
trademarks more than other parody targets. 3" Restricting the use of
trademarks, to comment on those trademarks, restricts the communication of
ideas and it is intolerable to ban speech about trademark owners simply because
it is unflattering. 3' Additionally, the only way to comment on the associations
of a product often is through the use of its trademark.
31
378. Novak used the insurance company's trademark to comment on nuclear holocaust, not
insurance. Id. at 398. Using the trademark to comment on something else, and not the trademark
itself, is more of a satiric use than a parodic use. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 580 (1994) ("the heart of any parodist's claim ... is the use of some elements . . . to
create a new [expression] that, at least in part, comments on that author's works"). In the case of
trademark parodies, of course, the emphasis is on comment on the associations affiliated with the
trademark, not an author's work as would be the case in a parody of a copyrighted work.
379. "When parody takes aim at a particular original work, the parody must be able to 'conjure
up' at least enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable." Campbell,
510 U.S. at 588. See also Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438-39 (9th Cir. 1986) ('When Sonny
Sniffs Glue" found to be fair use parody of the copyrighted work "When Sunny Gets Blue");
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broad. Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980) ("I Love
Sodom" a "Saturday Night Live" parody of "I Love New York" declared a fair use of a copyrighted
work).
380. See supra note 376 and accompanying text.
381. Cliff's Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d
Cir. 1989).
382. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1987).
383. Lucasfilm, Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 935 (D.D.C. 1985).
384. "It would be anomalous to diminish the protection afforded parody solely because a
parodist chooses a famous tradename, rather than a famous personality, author or creative work, as
its object." L.L. Bean, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33.
385. Id. at 31.
386. Shaughnessy, supra note 278, at 1113.
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Parallels exist between parodies of trademarks and celebrities. The First
Amendment protects parodies that attack celebrities and political figures because
celebrities are common points of reference. 3 The law allows celebrities to
be exposed to parodies because the parodies represent a means by which
commentators may show the weaknesses of ideas and values that are inextricably
associated with those celebrities. 388 This rationale also applies to famous
trademarks. These trademarks have established certain associations in
consumers' minds, and for both consumer protection and sociological purposes,
these associations must be open to comment.389 Just as forbidding the use of
celebrity names in communication is intolerable because of the resulting
restriction on ideas, 391 so also intangible trademarks should be exposed to
attack by parodies that comment on ideas and value, and perhaps even more so,
because the individual dignity interest of a human celebrity is not involved.
39
A trademark parody's commercial nature does not lessen its expressiveness.
In the modem age, advertising is a recognized avenue of expression. 31 Mass
communication, which includes advertising, substantially contributes to the
socialization of adults into new social values and the changing social norms.
393
The effects of advertising can reach far beyond the target market and into the
public domain, 31 thus becoming a source from which people learn about
society and culture. 3 5 To deny that expression is present in advertising is to
deny the role of advertising in American society.
31
Commercial trademark parodies should not be rendered unprotected simply
because they are commercial, because the First Amendment protects commercial
speech. Additionally, the First Amendment should protect commercial parodies
387. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major
League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 972 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing JOHN B. THOMPSON,
IDEOLOGY AND MODERN CULTURE: CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY IN THE ERA OF MASS
COMMUNICATION 163 (1990)).
388. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 972.
389. "In order to effectively criticize society, parodists need access to images that mean
something to people." Id.
390. "Restricting the use of celebrity identities restricts the communication of ideas." Id.
391. "Denying parodists the opportunity to poke fun at symbols and names which have become
woven into the fabric of our daily life, would constitute a serious curtailment of a protected form
of expression." L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1987).
392. Advertising has been recognized as "an information commodity far greater than anything
that it advertises. It is no longer possible to classify it as a mere means of selling goods and
services." MARSHALL MCLUHAN, CULTURE IS OUR BUSINESS 6 (1970).
393. CHARLES R. WRIGHT, MASS COMMUNICATION 20 (3d ed. 1986).
394. ANDREW WERNICK, PROMOTIONAL CULTURE 45 (1991).
395. WRIGHT, supra note 393, at 139.
396. "American ads are a ... world of 20th century folk art." MCLUHAN, supra note 392,
at 5.
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because these parodies represent a substantial First Amendment interest and
because they implicate a lesser interest in dilution. However, the FTDA does
not adequately protect commercial trademark parodies.
IV. THE PROPER BALANCE OF INTERESTS:
REPLACING THE FTDA EXCEPTIONS
Don't ask me what I think of you,
I might not give the answer that you want me to.191
The legislative history of the FTDA39 suggests that the Act adequately
addresses any First Amendment concerns that could arise. 399  While the
FTDA's exceptions do protect what are arguably the uses most deserving of
First Amendment protection, free speech principles extend beyond the most
deserving speech to cover some speech which may even be distasteful or
offensive.' The Hangunder hypothetical illustrates how, under the FTDA,
a prior restraint could be placed upon a commercial trademark parody," a
type of expression that the First Amendment should protect.' In intellectual
property cases, the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema,
Ltd.A4 approach, which would bar trademark parodies where the parodist has
any adequate alternative to using the trademark in his expression,' should
generally be eschewed.'
Because commercial speech is not unprotected, courts should consider the
competing interests when they encounter cases involving commercial, but
expressive, parodies of protected intellectual property." In dilution cases, the
competing interests include the prevention of dilution and the free expression of
trademark parody. Obviously, bright line tests ignore the special issues inherent
in any given case, and the statute would seem to provide better guidance to
397. FLEETWOOD MAC, Oh Well, on THEN PLAY ON (Reprise 1970).
398. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. 1 1996).
399. See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 241-47 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 351-60 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 361-96 and accompanying text.
403. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
404. Id. at 206 (citing Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758-59 (9th Cir.
1978)).
405. Shaughnessy, supra note 278, at 1111 (stating that the interest in intellectual property is
different than that in real property which was the precedent used to create the Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders approach). Accord Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d
959, 971 (10th Cir. 1996). But see Dr. Seuss Enters. L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F.
Supp. 1559, 1573 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (determining that the Supreme Court would prefer the Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders approach).
406. See supra notes 211-58 and accompanying text.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 3 [1998], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol32/iss3/5
1998] COMMERCIAL TRADEMARK PARODY 1023
courts by allowing the consideration of principles, rather than simply limiting
cases into the statutory exceptions.
This Note's proposed amendment would completely replace the present
FTDA exceptions' with a balancing test that is derived from First
Amendment doctrines in two areas of law. First, the balancing test borrows
from the treatment of trademark parodies in the realm of trademark
infringement.' ° Second, dilution actions represent a quasi-copyright in one's
trademark, because they allow owners exclusive rights to the use of their
expressive symbols.' ° As such, the proposed amendment borrows from the
copyright law defense of fair use.410 The balancing test employs a three
factored analysis. First, it considers the nature of the junior use, including any
commercial element. Second, it considers what harm might be visited upon the
senior mark. Third, a court would then balance these first two factors with a
third factor-the expressive interest in the junior use. Finally, the proposed
amendment lists some uses in which the balance of factors would favor an
exception from the statute.
This Note proposes amending 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) to read:41
A use of a trademark may be excepted from application of this statute
where the expressive value of the use exceeds the harm done to the
trademark by the use.. In determining whether the value of the use
407. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (Supp. 1 1996).
408. Guidance is taken from Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). See supra notes
251-58 and accompanying text.
409. Shaughnessy, supra note 278, at 1101.
410. This provisions reads:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the
factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
411. The original text reads:
The following shall not be actionable under this section:
(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative commercial
advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the owner of the
famous mark.
(B) Noncommercial use of a mark.
(C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (Supp. 1 1996).
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exceeds the harm to the trademark, the factors to be considered shall
include-
(A) the purpose and character of the defendant's use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature,
Commentary: This first factor borrows from the first factor of the copyright
exception for fair use.4"2  Under this factor, courts may consider the
commercial nature of the use, but that commercial nature will not be dispositive.
This factor would also lead courts to consider whether the use simply profits
from the reputation of another's mark. This factor will weigh more heavily in
the plaintiff's favor as the use becomes more commercial and the purpose
becomes less expressive." 3 In copyright law, this factor disfavors expressions
that blindly imitate the original as opposed to those that create new
expressions. 4 4 Similarly, under this factor, courts must evaluate whether the
new uses allign with the purpose of trademark law and are expressive without
confusing the public. 41 5
(B) the potential for dilution of the senior mark by the use,
Commentary: This factor borrows from the fourth factor of the copyright fair
use defense.41 6 As in the copyright analysis, this measures, in a more
quantitative fashion, the potential harm to the plaintiff. While with copyright
interests such harm is measured by the marketability of the expression, the
dilution analysis looks to the mark's distinctiveness.1 7
412. "In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the
factors to be considered shall include-(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes." 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1994).
413. See, e.g., Geri J. Yonover, The "Dissing" of DaVinci: The Imaginary Case of Leonardo
v. Duchamp: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 935, 984-85 (1995).
414. The purpose of copyright law is to reward and perpetuate authorship. Barbara Ringer,
Two Hundred Years of American Copyright Law, in 200 YEARS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN
PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW 117, 118 (1977).
415. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
416. "In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the
factors to be considered shall include- . . . (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
417. This is the ability of the mark to identify its source. STEPHEN R. ELIAS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW DICTIONARY 87 (Ralph Warner ed., 1985).
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(C) the predominance of the expressive element of the use.
Commentary: This factor, taken from the Rogers v. Grimaldi4t 8 decision,
leads courts to consider the interest that the public may have in the expressions
contained in a commercial trademark parody. Under this factor, courts will not
undertake qualitative analyses of the value of the expression (i.e., whether the
expression is offensive, political, etc.). Rather, courts will determine whether
the application of the statute restricts expression or whether the application
simply channels the speech to a less destructive conduit.
(D) The following is a list of examples of uses fitting the above
criteria, and is not intended to be exhaustive:
(a) fair use in truthful comparative advertising,4"9
(b) noncommercial uses,42
(c) news reporting and news commentary,4"'
(d) commercial parody not serving as the label for a
product.422
418. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
419. A fair use in comparative advertising would be excepted under the three factor balancing
test of the proposed § 1125 (c)(4). As to factor (A), this use would be predominately commercial
because it is advertising. This would weigh against excepting this use of a trademark from the
dilution action. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994) (stating that a
noncommercial use is a factor to be weighed). Yet, fair advertising is speech protected by the First
Amendment, provided it is truthful and nonmisleading. DORR & MUNCH, supra note 40, § 7.2.
However, as to factor (B), the potential for dilution of the subject mark by a comparative
advertisement would be minimal. There would be little likelihood of blurring, because to compare
the products or services the trademark would still be associated with the goods to which it was
originally attached. Similarly a comparative advertisement would not likely bear a danger of inferior
association. See supra notes 351-55 and accompanying text. As to factor (C), there is not much
expression in a comparative advertisement, but valuable commercial information is transmitted by
the use. See DORR & MUNCH, supra note 40, § 7.2.
420. The noncommercial nature of the use weighs in favor of excepting the use under factor
(A). GOLDSTEIN, supra note 268, at 673. Such a use may or may not risk tarnishment, blurring,
or harm to reputation, depending on the particular facts, leaving the situation as to factor (B)
unclear. However, being noncommercial, the expressive element of the use will predominate.
Thus, regardless of the outcome of factor (B), factors (A) and (C) weigh heavily in favor of
excepting a noncommercial use.
421. Under factor (A), this use should be excepted because news reporting is acknowledged as
protected speech. Under factor (B), news reporting should be excepted as there is little risk of
blurring because the mark is not being applied to another product and the danger of harm to
reputation is slight because the characterization of the mark and its associations will likely be
disinterested in news reporting. Under factor (C), use in news reporting should be excepted because
the use is simply to facilitate expression of newsworthy material. See supra note 330 and
accompanying text.
422. See infra notes 423-37 and accompanying text.
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Commentary: The original version of section 1125(c)(4) contained these
examples with the exception of (d), involving commercial trademark parodies
that do not simply label a product. This list illustrates that the amendment does
not narrow the protections offered potential defendants, but broadens the scope
of protection, especially to commercial uses that comment on ideas and values
but do not unduly dilute.
Returning to the Hangunder hypothetical, Hangunder would have to justify
its advertisement under the new three factored test. First, Hangunder's use is
a parody designed to stimulate sales of a pain reliever and is, therefore,
commercial." 3  This weighs against Hangunder. 424  However, as under
copyright law, this factor is meant to assess whether the purpose of the junior
use is to supersede the original or if it tends to be more transformative. 42  As
determined above, Hangunder's commercial trademark parody did not tend to
confuse consumers.426  Actually, the advertisement's memorable parodic
expression actually tends to identify Hangunder's pain reliever with Hangunder.
Similar to the way in which a transformative copyright work creates a new
expression, 42 7 the use of the Sudmeister mark and the frog marks in the
Hangunder advertisement creates a new set of marks that identify Hangunder
with the pain reliever. Thus, under the first factor, while the commercial nature
of the parody may weigh somewhat against Hangunder, the transformative
nature of the use counterbalances.
As to the second factor, the court must consider the effect of Hangunder's
parody on the market of Anheuser-Busch's trademarks.42 The court will not
assume an adverse impact on the market simply because the parodic use is
commercial.429 To draw another analogy from copyright law, a parody of a
copyrighted work does not replace the original in the marketplace, and
Hangunder's parody of Budweiser's trademarks will not affect the ability of
those names to identify the source of the goods.4" In fact, Hangunder's
423. Proposing a commercial transaction is commercial speech. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748, 760 (1976).
424. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (involving a copyright fair use defense raised against
infringement action for rap parody of pop song "Pretty Woman" and stating that factors such as
commercialism weigh against fair use). The author will use this case to illustrate application of
copyright fair use factors.
425. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
426. See supra notes 263-319 and accompanying text.
427. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
428. Id. at 590. Whereas copyright would look to the effect on the marketability of the targeted
expression, trademark would look to the effect on the ability of the senior mark to identify its
source.
429. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
430. Id.
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parody, rather than weakening the ability of the Budweiser and frog trademarks
to identify Anheuser-Busch as their source, may actually strengthen that
ability.43' The court should not recognize any argument by Anheuser-Busch
that the parody makes beer unattractive and damages the market for beer. A
trademark parody is akin to a copyright parody that criticizes a targeted
copyrighted expression and may similarly contain protected expression.432 The
trademark parody does not affect the ability of the senior mark to identify its
source; rather, it comments on the associations the audience has with the
product. Therefore, under this second factor, the balance is in favor of
excepting the Hangunder commercial trademark parody from a FTDA claim.
Finally, the third factor also weighs in favor of excepting the Hangunder
commercial trademark parody. Under the Rogers433 test, a trademark use to
be protected from a trademark infringement action by the First Amendment must
have artistic relevance to the expression in which it is used. 4  The court
would likely conclude that the parody of the Anheuser-Busch trademarks, in
commenting on Budweiser and beer consumption, has artistic relevance to the
expressive commentary on Budweiser's trademark associations. Additionally,
the parodic expression is relevant to its commercial use because a hangover
relief is related to alcohol consumption. Where the risk of harm to the senior
trademark is slight and the junior use of the trademark has artistic relevance to
the expression with which it is associated, the law should not restrict
expression. 435 Additionally, like in Rogers where the court concluded that the
use was not explicitly misleading as to its source, 436 courts, in applying this
factor, will look to whether the use explicitly dilutes. As the Rogers court
discounted a use that would, at most, incidentally confuse consumers, 43 7 courts
would excuse Hangunder under this factor. Certainly the use of the Anheuser-
Busch trademarks was more expressive than commercial. While the parody was
located within an advertisement that proposed a commercial transaction, the
parody was not integral to the transaction as if it were a label on the product to
431. Welkowitz, supra note 96, at 556 (noting that trademark parodies will not cause consumers
to lose the connection between the senior trademark and its source).
432. A parody of a copyrighted work that criticizes its subject is not a cognizable claim.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994).
433. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). See supra note 251-58 and
accompanying text.
434. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
435. Id. at 1000.
436. Rogers was a case involving a trademark infringement action so the court needed to assess
whether the use of the trademark was meant to mislead and likely to confuse the audience. Because
this note regards dilution and not infringement, the salient concern is the diluting, not confusing
quality of the use.
437. In Rogers, the use of the names Fred and Ginger on the film title only incidentally
indicated that those people were portrayed in the film or approved it. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1000.
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be sold. Both elements of the Hangunder advertisement, the expressive parody
and the commercial proposition of the pain reliever, are able to stand on their
own for their own purposes.
Thus, the proposed amendment guides courts to a proper balancing of the
relevant issues and interests raised in a commercial trademark parody dilution
suit. In doing so, the amendment correctly protects parodies under the First
Amendment, without unnecessarily jeopardizing the interests of senior trademark
owners. While the amendment would require greater judicial care in applying
the statute and considering commercial trademark parody cases and could create
some ambiguity for the parties involved, such is the nature of the delicate
balance of interests in these cases.
V. CONCLUSION
With recent developments in First Amendment jurisprudence, commercial
speech is receiving increasing protection from the courts. Adding to this the
expressive value of a parody, court should accord First Amendment protection
to some commercial trademark parodies. While the FTDA 38 is claimed to
address First Amendment concerns adequately, the Act fails properly to account
for many commercial trademark parodies. Thus, Congress should amend the
FTDA to incorporate the First Amendment protections granted to parodies under
other intellectual property laws. Congress could accomplish this by replacing
the existing bright line exceptions in the FTDA with a more flexible, sensitive
test that balances the expressive and trademark protection interests at stake.
Anthony Pearson
438. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. 1 1996).
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